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acP: african, Caribbean and pacific states
cPIa: Country policy and institutional assessment
Edf: european development funds
GBs: general budget support
mdG: millennium development goals
PEfa: public expenditure and financial accountability
Pfm: public finance management
sBs: sector budget support
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eXeCuTive  
summarY
I.
The european Court of auditors has car-
ried out a performance audit to assess 
whether the european Commission man-
ages its general budget support (gbs) pro-
grammes effectively. gbs has a number of 
potential advantages over the traditional 
project approach. it can supply larger vol-
umes of aid in a more predictable manner 
and since it funds the national develop-
ment strategy of the partner country the 
latter tends to have more ownership of this 
aid instrument. as it is channelled through 
the national budget, it can encourage the 
improvement of public finance manage-
ment (pfm) by the partner country and 
increase domestic accountability. it is also 
seen as a way of strengthening policy dia-
logue and improving the harmonisation 
and coordination of aid between donors, 
thereby potentially increasing the effi-
ciency of aid delivery and reducing the 
costs for the partner country. gbs has been 
increasingly used by the Commission over 
the last decade in order to achieve its main 
development policy objective of reducing 
poverty.
II.
gbs programmes typically consist of a 
support package involving the transfer of 
funds, capacity-building measures, dia-
logue with the partner country and the 
establishment of conditions for disburse-
ment. a number of other donors use gbs 
and the Commission has to coordinate its 
programmes closely with theirs.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
7 7
special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
v.
The Commission has not yet developed 
a sound risk management framework to 
properly assess and reduce the risks of 
its gbs programmes. This is of particular 
importance in view of the high levels of 
fiduciary risk associated with weak pfm 
systems and significant levels of corrup-
tion, and of the development risk arising 
from weaknesses in the national devel-
opment strategies of many partner coun-
tries.
vI.
The rationale followed by the Commission 
to set the amount of funds to be allocated 
to individual gbs programmes is not clear. 
it was, however, noted that the Commis-
sion has improved the predictability of its 
disbursements to partner countries which 
is important for their budgetary manage-
ment.
vII.
The capacity-building support provided is 
useful in strengthening pfm, although it 
was not based on an appropriate assess-
ment of priority needs. in particular, insuf-
ficient attention has been given to the 
need to strengthen oversight bodies such 
as supreme audit institutions, parliaments 
and civil society organisations seeking 
to monitor government use of budget-
ary resources. it has also been little used 
to support other gbs objectives, nota-
bly in relation to health and education. 
The Commission has often not been able 
to fully implement the capacity-building 
support within the timeframe of the gbs 
programmes. however, in 2008 the Com-
mission adopted a strategy that aims to 
improve the effectiveness of its technical 
cooperation.
III.
as with other aid modalities, the ulti-
mate impact of gbs on poverty reduction 
depends on the specific circumstances in 
each country. it also depends on the effec-
tive Commission’s management of its gbs 
programmes. The Court found that, whilst 
the Commission has made considerable 
efforts over the last decade to develop its 
approach to providing aid through gbs, 
there are still weaknesses in the methodol-
ogy and management of gbs programmes 
in aCp, latin american and asian countries, 
which are thus less likely to reach their full 
potential effectiveness.
Iv.
The Court found that, whilst a positive fea-
ture of the Commission’s approach is the 
systematic inclusion of macroeconomic 
and pfm objectives, the objectives of gbs 
programmes do not sufficiently take into 
account the specific circumstances and 
changing priorities of partner countries, 
as well as other programmes implemented 
by the Commission and other donors. fur-
thermore, although some improvement has 
been noted in more recent programmes, 
the objectives of the programmes tend to 
be formulated in terms which are too gen-
eral and this hinders the design of the var-
ious components of the programmes and 
makes it more difficult to hold the Com-
mission accountable for their effective-
ness.
eXeCuTive 
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vIII.
The  performance-based  conditions  
attached by the Commission to disburse-
ment of gbs are generally relevant but are 
unlikely to achieve their intended incen-
tive effect because of the way they are 
designed and implemented. it is often dif-
ficult to assess whether conditions have 
been met or not, in particular because 
of a lack of clarity over what constitutes 
satisfactory progress, and weaknesses in 
the statistical systems used for assessing 
results.
IX.
whilst gbs programmes have had a cata-
lytic effect in respect of strengthening 
dialogue on the national budget and pfm, 
the Commission does not make full use of 
the instrument’s potential because it has 
insufficient expertise in the priority areas 
related to the gbs programmes’ objectives 
and there are weaknesses in its manage-
ment of the dialogue process. 
X.
The Commission’s external reporting on 
general budget support tends to focus 
on its potential benefits to improving aid 
delivery but there is relatively little infor-
mation on its actual impact on poverty 
reduction. an evaluation methodology 
which provides evidence on whether, and 
in what circumstances, budget support can 
make an effective contribution to poverty 
reduction has not yet been established. 
however, the Commission is leading donor 
efforts to develop such a methodology.
XI.
The Commission is aware of the need to 
improve its management of gbs and at 
the end of 2009 launched a revision of its 
internal guidelines to address most of the 
issues raised by the Court in this report 
which contains a series of recommenda-
tions for the Commission to consider in 
this context.
eXeCuTive  
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inTroduCTion
1.    poverty reduction is the overarching goal of eu development 
cooperation and over the last decade general budget support 
(gbs) has been increasingly used by the european Commission, 
as well as by other donors, as a means to try to achieve this 
objective. it involves the transfer of funds by the Commis-
sion to the national treasury of a partner country in order to 
provide additional budgetary resources to support a national 
development strategy. The transfer of funds in this way is also 
intended to contribute to macroeconomic stability which is 
generally considered fundamental to development and pov-
erty reduction. in addition, the channelling of funds through 
national financial systems is also intended to lead to improve-
ments in public finance management (pfm) since effective 
pfm systems also play an important role in poverty reduction 
efforts.
2.  The Commission’s gbs programmes, and those of other donors, 
involve not only the transfer of funds but also three other 
components which provide key inputs to support programme 
objectives: 
capacity development measures, mainly through techni- (a) 
cal assistance, to help countries strengthen their policy-
making and management (see paragraph 49); 
the establishing of conditions for the release of funds  (b) 
which are linked to the programme objectives and agreed 
between the partner country and the donors. The Commis-
sion’s approach to using conditions has focused on trying 
to give countries greater incentives to achieve results by 
using a so-called ‘variable tranche’ mechanism to reward 
performance (see paragraph 58);
dialogue with the country on the design, implementation  (c) 
and results of national and sectoral policies including the 
budget. increased opportunities for dialogue are often 
considered to be a particular benefit of budget support 
(see paragraph 68).10
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3.  general budget support has many similarities with sector 
budget support which also involves the transfer of funds to 
the national treasury. however, sector budget support pro-
grammes aim to support a sector policy rather than a national 
strategy. accordingly, capacity-building, conditions and dia-
logue all focus on supporting the selected sector.
4.  an important feature of gbs is the close cooperation it en-
tails between donors, since they are all supporting the same 
national strategy and using the same national systems. This 
means that, when setting the objectives of its gbs programmes 
and planning the transfer of funds, capacity-building meas-
ures, conditions and dialogue arrangements needed to achieve 
these objectives, the Commission also has to seek to ensure 
that these inputs are coordinated with the inputs of other 
donors.
5.    Close donor coordination over gbs is also seen as best practice 
in order to reduce the transaction costs to partner countries 
of having to deal with numerous donors on a bilateral basis. 
nevertheless, while following the principle of donor harmo-
nisation, the Commission continues to have sole responsibil-
ity for taking financing decisions and is accountable to the 
discharge authority for the use of eu funds. balancing the 
necessary donor partnership approach and the responsibility 
and accountability it has for its gbs programmes inevitably 
represents a difficult challenge for the Commission.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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BudGEt suPPort Is thE PrEfErrEd aId 
modalIty of many donors
6.    The Commission has given gbs to aCp countries since the 
seventh edf (1990–95) and to asian and latin american coun-
tries since 2003. The Cotonou agreement provides for the 
possibility of giving gbs to aCp countries1 and it was also 
formally included in the new 2006 development Cooperation 
instrument regulation2 covering asia and latin america. for 
the management of gbs the Commission uses comprehensive 
internal guidelines3 which it first developed in 2002, thor-
oughly revised in 2007 and then updated in 2009. during this 
audit the Commission launched another major revision that is 
scheduled to be completed in 2010. The Commission has also 
developed a series of training courses for its staff on different 
aspects of budget support.
7.  budget support, either gbs or sector budget support (sbs), 
has become the preferred aid modality of many donors, in-
cluding the Commission, because they consider it the most 
effective way to deliver aid. in the paris declaration, signed 
in 2005, donors committed themselves to channelling increas-
ing amounts of assistance through country systems. The eu 
specifically committed itself to achieving this objective by 
delivering 50 % of its government-to-government assistance 
through country systems by 2010. in 2008, the accra agenda 
for action went further than the paris declaration by stating 
that the use of partner country systems — meaning, princi-
pally, budget support — should in future be the ‘first option’ 
for delivering aid and that donors should give clear reasons 
if they did not use them.
8.    The volume of eu budget support has increased accordingly 
over time. whereas budget support represented 30 % (gbs: 
21 %, sbs: 9 %) of total funding under the ninth edf (2001–07), 
it is expected to reach 48 % (gbs: 31 %, sbs: 17 %) of total 
funding under the 10th edf (2008–13). for the asia and latin 
america regions, the proportion delivered through budget sup-
port increased from 12 % (gbs: 3 %, sbs: 9 %) in the 2003–05     
period to 25 % (gbs: 5 %, sbs: 20 %) in the 2006–09 period. 
gbs has been used in 35 aCp countries and has so far also been 
given in seven asian and latin american countries. Annexes I 
and II present the commitments per country.
1  article 61.
2  regulation (eC) no 1905/2006 
of the european parliament and 
of the Council of 18 december 
2006 establishing a financing 
instrument for development 
cooperation, article 25(1)(b)  
(oj l 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41).
3  ‘guidelines on the 
programming, design and 
management of general budget 
support’ which are available on 
the europeaid website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/
what/economic-support/
documents/guidelines_budget_
support_en.pdf).12
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GBs has many PotEntIal BEnEfIts 
comParEd to ProvIdInG aId throuGh 
ProjEcts 
9.    There are various potential benefits in providing aid through 
gbs rather than through funding specific projects. it can sup-
ply larger volumes of aid in a more predictable manner and 
since it funds the national development strategies of partner 
countries the latter tend to have stronger ownership of this aid 
instrument. as it is channelled through the national   budget, 
it can encourage the improvement of public finance manage-
ment and planning by the partner country and increase do-
mestic accountability. furthermore, gbs is seen as a way of 
strengthening policy dialogue and improving the harmonisa-
tion and coordination of aid between donors, thereby poten-
tially increasing the efficiency of aid delivery and reducing 
the costs for the partner country.
10.    as with other aid modalities, the ultimate effectiveness of gbs 
in terms of reducing poverty levels depends on the specific 
circumstances in each country. The legal framework4 stipulates 
that gbs can only be given if there is a sound macroeconomic 
policy, a well-defined national development policy and suf-
ficiently transparent, reliable and effective pfm. The Commis-
sion interprets these conditions in a dynamic manner. in its 
view, the weaknesses affecting pfm and the national develop-
ment strategy of the partner country at the time of the financ-
ing decision do not preclude the launch of a gbs programme, 
provided that the will to reform exists and the reforms are 
relevant and credible. in this way it takes account not only of 
the initial situation, but also of the direction being taken by 
the partner country. other budget support donors follow a 
similar approach.
11.    as well as the specific circumstances in each country, a second 
major factor influencing the impact of gbs programmes is how 
well the Commission manages these programmes. This report 
addresses the question: ‘does the Commission manage its gbs 
programmes effectively?’
4  article 61(2) of the Cotonou 
agreement and article 25(1)(b) 
of the development Cooperation 
instrument regulation.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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12.  To answer the question, ‘does the Commission manage its gbs 
programmes effectively?’ the audit focused on four key areas.
does the Commission appropriately select and formu- (a) 
late the objectives and expected results of its gbs pro-
grammes?
does the Commission appropriately manage the main risks  (b) 
to the effectiveness of gbs programmes?
does the Commission design and implement its gbs pro- (c) 
grammes effectively?
does the Commission report in a clear, exhaustive and ac- (d) 
curate manner on whether gbs is meeting its objectives?
13.    The audit focused on the Commission’s management of gbs 
programmes in aCp, latin american and asian countries. given 
their particularities, countries in a fragile situation were ex-
cluded from the scope of this audit. The audit covered the 
ninth and 10th edfs, which means commitments made from 
2001 onwards, and all gbs programmes under the general 
budget, the first of which was committed in 2003. The Com-
mission’s assessments of countries’ eligibility for gbs are ad-
dressed by the Court’s financial audits, the findings of which 
are presented in the Court’s annual reports. This report refers 
to these findings where relevant. The audit did not aim to 
make an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of 
gbs compared to other aid modalities.
14.    The audit involved an analytical review of all gbs programmes 
funded in these regions over the 2001 to 2009 period to assess 
the Commission’s approach to managing gbs. it included visits 
to four countries: benin, laos, paraguay and uganda. during 
those visits, the Court’s auditors interviewed Commission staff, 
representatives of national authorities and other donors. in 
addition, gbs programmes in nicaragua and vietnam were cov-
ered through a documentary review and questionnaires sent 
to the Commission delegations in the two countries. The audit 
also involved meetings with the pefa5 secretariat, the world 
bank and the international monetary fund and a mission to 
the united kingdom to visit the department for international 
development, the national audit office and a consultancy 
company. The audit was carried out between may 2009 and 
may 2010.
5  public expenditure and 
financial accountability.
audiT sCope and approaCh14
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thE commIssIon InsuffIcIEntly taIlors 
thE oBjEctIvEs of Its GBs ProGrammEs 
to thE sPEcIfIc cIrcumstancEs of Each 
country
15.    The overall objective of gbs programmes is to support the 
implementation of a country’s national development strategy6. 
The Commission seeks to align the specific objectives of its 
programmes with these strategies.
16.    This section addresses the question of whether the Commission 
adequately selects and formulates the objectives and expected 
results of its gbs programmes. The Court examined whether 
programme objectives are precise and tailored to country cir-
cumstances. furthermore, the Court examined whether the 
objectives include strengthening pfm in partner countries and 
whether programmes clearly set out how budget support will 
contribute to achieving the expected results.
thE oBjEctIvEs of GBs ProGrammEs tEnd to 
BE sImIlar for all PartnEr countrIEs dEsPItE 
thEIr dIffErEnt sItuatIons
17.    for the most part the objectives of gbs programmes are very 
similar across the different countries where the Commission 
uses this aid modality. in particular in aCp countries, in the 
great majority of cases over the last 10 years, each gbs pro-
gramme has had objectives relating to four areas: macroeco-
nomic stability, pfm, health and education7. This ‘one size 
fits all’ approach does not sufficiently take into account each 
country’s specific and changing priorities or the other pro-
grammes funded by the Commission and other donors in the 
country.
6  frequently such national 
development strategies have 
been presented in the form of 
‘poverty reduction strategy 
papers’ although in recent years 
this designation has been used 
less often.
7  according to the 
Commission’s internal 
guidelines, ‘where support is 
being given to poverty reduction 
strategy papers, it is normal to 
focus on the social sectors of 
education and health as being 
key elements in reducing income 
and non-income poverty’.
observaTionsspecial report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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18.  The systematic inclusion of overall economic governance ob-
jectives relating to macroeconomic stability and pfm reform is 
a positive feature of the Commission’s gbs programmes. both 
are essential to achieving the gbs programmes’ overarching 
objective of contributing to poverty reduction. however, the 
pfm objectives selected are often not tailored to address the 
pfm reform priorities of individual partner countries. Thus, for 
example, in laos, pfm objectives do not address the important 
areas of internal control and corruption and in vietnam pfm 
issues have not been prioritised. in paraguay and nicaragua, 
although pfm diagnostics identified significant weaknesses, 
the gbs programmes do not formulate specific programme 
objectives relating to pfm. 
19.  as regards the other objectives of gbs programmes, the Com-
mission’s approach does not adequately reflect the fact that 
the national development strategies of some countries have 
moved in recent years to growth-targeted approaches in order 
to achieve the overarching objective of poverty reduction. 
This change is not reflected in the objectives of the new gbs 
programmes to support such national strategies. an example 
is uganda’s new ‘national development plan’ which was be-
ing prepared at the time of the Court’s audit. it placed much 
more emphasis on infrastructure and private sector develop-
ment than previous national development strategies which 
had taken the form of ‘poverty eradication action plans’8. al-
though the Commission’s internal guidelines recognise that 
growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, they 
do not address the new importance attached to it by partner 
countries and how the Commission should deal with it when 
selecting programme objectives and related conditions.
8  uganda’s first poverty 
eradication action plan was 
established in 1997. it served 
as a model for the subsequent 
‘poverty reduction strategy 
papers’ which the world bank 
encouraged other developing 
countries to draw up. 16
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9  dominican republic, 
mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia.
10  guiding principle no 1 of eu 
Code of Conduct.
20.    The Commission’s programming procedures provide for each 
country’s overall aid allocation to be largely channelled into 
no more than two priority or ‘focal’ sectors and, if the country 
is eligible for it, gbs. The Commission’s relatively standardised 
approach to setting gbs programme objectives does not take 
into account the focal sectors selected. in some countries this 
has also led the Commission to having both gbs programmes 
with health and education objectives and also health and/or 
education as sectors with funding channelled through sbs. 
in such cases the value added of the gbs programme having 
education and health objectives is unclear. The Court identi-
fied such cases in the current programmes of four aCp coun-
tries9. This was less of a problem in asia and latin america, 
mainly because gbs programmes in these countries tend to 
be less standardised and have more focused objectives. gbs 
programmes in asian countries, for example, are structured 
around world bank poverty reduction support credits, which 
place particular emphasis on growth as a key element in re-
ducing poverty, rather than on social sectors.
21.    The Commission’s use of standardised objectives for its gbs 
programmes means that it is difficult to adjust the programmes 
to coordinate them with other donors’ objectives for their gbs 
programmes. moreover, the 2007 eu Code of Conduct on Com-
plementarity and division of labour in development policy 
requires the Commission and member states to aim at focusing 
their active involvement in a partner country on a maximum of 
three sectors10. This raises the question of the extent to which 
gbs programmes should have sectoral objectives since this 
requires the participation of the Commission in these sectors 
in addition to the two focal sectors.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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thE oBjEctIvEs of GBs ProGrammEs arE oftEn 
dEfInEd In tErms WhIch arE too GEnEral
22.    The objectives of gbs programmes are formulated in most 
cases in rather general terms and do not set out clearly what 
the programmes are expected to achieve and by when (see 
Box 1). This is detrimental to the design of the various compo-
nents of gbs programmes, namely the transfer of funds, capac-
ity development, conditions and dialogue (see paragraphs 1 
and 2). moreover, it does not allow an objective assessment of 
whether objectives have been achieved, making it more diffi-
cult to hold the Commission accountable for the effectiveness 
of its gbs programmes.
sElEctInG and formulatInG oBjEctIvEs
Good commission practice: laos
The Commission’s gbs programmes in laos11 are integrated12 in the world bank’s budget support 
policy matrices which provide clear, detailed information on priority actions to be completed within 
the timeframe of the programme. for instance, the objective to introduce key pfm reforms is broken 
down into three detailed objectives relating to the budgetary process, the transparency of intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers and the financial audit function. for each of these detailed objectives, the 
policy matrices define which actions the government has to take during each year of the programmes’ 
implementation. The clear link with performance indicators allows objective monitoring of the achieve-
ment of the objectives of the programme.
Weak commission practice: nicaragua
The financing agreement for the Commission’s gbs programme in nicaragua13 focuses on rural areas 
but does not define general and specific objectives and expected results. it refers to the overall objec-
tives of the national development plan, but does not set out what the Commission expects the gbs to 
achieve. furthermore, the expected contribution to pfm is unclear. although the financing agreement 
describes pfm weaknesses and the main measures taken by the government to improve the pfm system, 
pfm improvement is not an explicit objective of the programme.
11   a first programme with a single fixed tranche of 3,2 million euro was committed in 2007 and a second four-year programme for  
13,0 million euro in 2008.
12   on the one hand, the Commission has an input when poverty reduction support operations are set up and, on the other hand, the 
Commission draws from the poverty reduction support operations when setting objectives and defining conditions for its gbs 
programmes.
13   The gbs programme was committed in december 2004 and provides for an amount of 68 million euro to be disbursed over the 
period from 2006 to 2009.
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23.  some progress was made in the financing agreements under 
the 10th edf in improving the formulation of objectives by 
clearly distinguishing general and specific objectives in the 
structure of the document. by revising its internal guidance 
on budget support (see paragraph 6), the Commission intends 
to introduce further improvements by requiring its staff to:
specify in the financing documents the steps needed to  (a) 
implement pfm reforms and national development strate-
gies or sector policies;
establish medium-term objectives for the programme. (b) 
thE commIssIon doEs not aPProPrIatEly 
manaGE thE maIn rIsks to EffEctIvE GBs
24.  all development cooperation involves taking risks which may 
have an impact on the effectiveness of the aid. gbs involves 
risks that are different from those arising from the traditional 
project approach to development cooperation. The main risks 
to the effectiveness of gbs are fiduciary risk and development 
risk: fiduciary risk can be defined as the risk that government 
funding is not used for the intended purpose of poverty re-
duction; development risk can be defined as the risk that the 
national policies and strategies supported by gbs are inad-
equate.
25.  This section addresses the question of whether the Commis-
sion appropriately manages the main risks affecting the ef-
fectiveness of gbs. The Court examined how the Commission 
assessed fiduciary and development risks and what steps it 
took to manage those risks through relevant capacity develop-
ment, conditions, dialogue and measures for monitoring and 
reducing risk.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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14  The Court’s special report 
no 2/2005 concerning edf 
budget aid to aCp countries: the 
Commission’s management of 
the public finance reform aspect, 
paragraph 13.
15  The assessment was carried 
out in the context of the 
programming of the10th edf. 
such an assessment was 
not carried out for non-aCp 
countries.
thE rIsk manaGEmEnt framEWork Is  
not WEll dEvEloPEd
26.    The eligibility conditions for budget support are designed to 
ensure that gbs is only provided in countries which have the 
necessary framework for gbs to be effective: a sound macro-
economic policy, a well-defined national development policy 
and a sufficiently transparent, reliable and effective pfm sys-
tem (see paragraph 10). since the Commission uses a   dynamic 
interpretation of the eligibility conditions, the existence of 
significant weaknesses in pfm or development strategies at the 
time of the financing decision does not preclude the launch of 
a gbs programme, provided that the partner country is com-
mitted to reform and its progress in implementing reforms is 
deemed to be relevant and credible. implementing reforms is a 
lengthy process. whilst the dynamic approach means that the 
Commission, together with other donors, is investing in the 
future, it needs to assess and reduce the risks that result from 
systems that do not immediately provide sufficient guarantees 
in terms of transparency, efficiency and effectiveness14.
27.  for aCp countries15, the Commission’s assessment of risk has 
focused on the risk of countries not continuing to meet eligi-
bility conditions throughout the entire implementation period 
of the gbs programmes. This assessment was based on the 
country’s previous track record with gbs and its future pros-
pects for meeting the eligibility criteria. The conclusions of 
the assessment were an important factor in deciding whether 
or not to provide budget support in those countries (see para-
graph 45). although this risk assessment is useful, it is not 
sufficient as it does not cover the potential impact of fiduciary 
risk and development risk on the effectiveness of gbs.20
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28.  The Commission’s internal guidelines do not provide for the 
assessment of fiduciary and development risks. The main types 
of risks are not identified and there is no guidance on how to 
assess the significance, probability and potential impact of 
risks. furthermore, it is not clear how risk-mitigating measures 
such as capacity-building support, dialogue, conditions and 
shorter-term measures are to be designed for the different 
types and levels of risk and how these measures should be 
coordinated with other donors.
rIsks arE hIGh In most countrIEs BEnEfItInG 
from GBs But arE not adEQuatEly addrEssEd 
By thE commIssIon
Fiduciary r i s k
29.  gbs is mostly provided in countries with weak pfm systems. 
This is demonstrated by the annual Country policy and in-
stitutional assessment (Cpia) published by the world bank 
where the indicator for the quality of budgetary and financial 
management is relatively low for the majority of countries 
benefiting from gbs16. weak pfm systems can lead to waste of 
funds and inefficiency which reduce the effectiveness of gbs 
programmes in achieving their poverty reduction objectives.
30.  another consequence of weak pfm systems is increased cor-
ruption. The Cpia also includes an indicator concerning trans-
parency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector 
whose score is similarly low for most countries benefiting 
from gbs17. further indications of the often high level of cor-
ruption can be derived from the Corruption perception index 
published by Transparency international. among the 27 aCp 
countries that are not in a fragile situation18 and for which 
gbs has been planned in the country strategy papers for the 
10th edf, 12 of them19, on the basis of the 2009 Corruption 
perception index, are classified as having ‘rampant corrup-
tion’20. among the six latin american and asian countries with 
gbs programmes, five of them21 have the same classification. 
16  The Cpia assesses how 
conducive the country’s policy 
and institutional framework is 
to fostering poverty reduction, 
sustainable growth, and the 
effective use of development 
assistance. The world bank 
uses the Cpia ratings in its aid 
allocation process. The Cpia 
consists of 16 indicators that 
are rated on a scale of one (low) 
to six (high). for the aCp, asian 
and latin american countries 
benefiting from gbs, the 
scoring in 2008 for indicator 13, 
‘Quality of budgetary and 
financial management’ averages 
3,4, ranging from 2,0 to 4,0.
17  for the aCp, asian and latin 
american countries benefiting 
from gbs the scoring in 2008 
for indicator 16, ‘Transparency, 
accountability and corruption in 
the public sector’ averages 3,0, 
ranging from 2,0 to 4,5.
18  These countries were not 
included in the scope of the 
audit (see paragraph 13).
19  benin, ethiopia, gambia, 
guyana, kenya, mali, mauritania, 
mozambique, niger, Tanzania, 
Togo and uganda.
20  Corruption perception index 
of less than three. The index 
ranges from zero (high risk) to 
ten (low risk).
21  Cambodia, laos, nicaragua, 
paraguay and vietnam.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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31.  The Court found that relevant information on pfm systems and 
the reform programmes to improve them is available to the 
Commission for its decision-making and monitoring purposes. 
The public expenditure and financial accountability (pefa) are 
a particularly useful source of information on pfm systems. 
These are based on a common methodology drawn up in 2005 
through joint donor efforts, including significant inputs from 
the Commission. The pefa assessments have been carried out 
for many countries22 and report on the state of a country’s 
pfm system according to 28 indicators. The assessments have 
in many countries stimulated pfm dialogue and the drawing 
up of pfm reform action plans and support programmes. The 
results of the assessments also provide a good basis for meas-
uring improvement over time. They are complemented in this 
respect by annual pfm reports prepared by delegations that 
generally provide a good overview of the pfm situation and 
recent developments.
32.  nevertheless, the Commission does not assess and conclude 
on fiduciary risk. This is partly because, unlike some member 
states such as france23 and the united kingdom24 and other 
organisations25, it has no methodology for doing this. further-
more it has insufficient information on how well pfm systems 
are actually working in practice. The pefa assessments are not 
intended to be a fiduciary risk assessment tool because they 
do not contain a sufficiently in-depth assessment of the ex-
tent to which controls and procedures are complied with and 
the estimated impact of corruption. such information should 
normally be found in the annual reports of the supreme audit 
institutions and other oversight bodies. however, in uganda, 
where the supreme audit institution issues an annual audit 
report reasonably on time, the Commission delegation had not 
made sufficient use of it for identifying fiduciary problems. in 
most countries supreme audit institutions issue their reports 
with significant delays or, in the case of laos, they are not 
even made public. 
22  pefa assessments have 
been carried out for all of the 
28 aCp countries for which gbs 
commitments were made under 
the 10th edf as at 31 december 
2009. for nine of these countries 
more than one pefa assessment 
had been carried out, which 
in principle should enable the 
measurement of progress over 
time. some of these follow-up 
assessments, however, aim to 
create a more reliable baseline 
than the first assessment and 
thus do not enable the tracking 
of performance changes from 
the previous assessment. for 
asian and latin american 
countries, pefa assessments 
were made in four out of the 
six countries in which gbs has 
been provided so far by the 
Commission.
23  ‘doctrine en matière de 
risque fiduciaire dans les états 
étrangers’, france Coopération, 
april 2008.
24 ‘managing fiduciary risk in 
dfid bilateral aid programmes’, 
dfid, january 2008.
25  This lack of methodology 
contrasted with, for instance, 
the approach followed by the 
asian development bank for 
its sectoral budget support 
interventions in laos. The adb 
had developed a matrix setting 
out each significant risk, how it 
would be addressed and over 
what time period.22
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33.  in addition, for most countries examined, the lack of transpar-
ency in the presentation of national and subnational budg-
ets also makes it difficult for the Commission to analyse how 
budgetary resources are being used. diagnostic studies such 
as public expenditure tracking surveys26 and public expendi-
ture reviews27 can help compensate for a lack of information by 
identifying major inefficiencies and leakages, so that donors 
and beneficiary governments can prioritise their efforts on 
first addressing these problems. The Commission has made 
relatively little use of such tools.
34.  The Commission applies a number of methods in its gbs pro-
grammes to contribute to reducing fiduciary risk, in particu-
lar the pfm eligibility criterion, which requires satisfactory 
progress in pfm reform, and other pfm conditions attached 
to disbursements. Commission support for pfm reform pro-
grammes through capacity-building and dialogue is also used 
to reduce risk. however, the lack of a thorough and explicit 
fiduciary risk assessment makes it harder to draw up a risk 
reduction plan which clearly sets out the risks and defines 
what measures are needed to reduce them and over what time 
period. moreover, Commission risk reduction measures mostly 
focus on improvements which will only have an impact over 
the medium to long term. little use has been made of shorter-
term measures agreed with partner governments to address 
high-risk areas through, for example, assisting supreme   audit 
institutions to carry out more prompt and higher quality 
  audits or supporting countries in the application of standard 
international procurement procedures (see Box 2).
35.    while the Commission did include such measures for reducing 
risk in the design of its gbs programmes under the ninth edf 
in uganda and benin, such as the use of private audit firms to 
assist supreme audit institutions in carrying out audits and 
the carrying out of public expenditure tracking surveys and 
public expenditure reviews, they were not accompanied by a 
clear and agreed plan of implementation that sets out how 
and by when these measures would address specific risks. in 
fact, most of the planned measures were ultimately not im-
plemented. The gbs programmes under the 10th edf for these 
countries and the gbs programmes of the asian and latin 
american countries examined do not provide for shorter-term 
measures.
26  The public expenditure 
tracking survey is a method used 
to study the flow of public funds 
and other resources, through 
the various levels of government 
and administrative hierarchy. it 
is most relevant where public 
accounting systems function 
poorly or provide unreliable 
information.
27  public expenditure reviews 
analyse the allocation and 
management of public 
expenditure. They may cover 
all government expenditure 
or focus on a few priority 
sectors (e.g. health, education, 
agriculture, water, roads). 
They can be used to inform 
strategic planning and budget 
preparation and to identify 
ways in which to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness 
of resource allocations. 
increasingly, they also review 
expenditure management 
systems and institutions.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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rEducInG fIducIary rIsk
Good commission practice: Ethiopia
The protection of basic services program ii28 was designed to support the budgets of regional level 
and lower tiers of government which were responsible for basic services such as education, health 
and water. The programme contains strengthened reporting and accountability measures to enable 
verification that the services were reaching the intended beneficiaries. These measures include more 
regular and timely reporting on regional and local spending for basic services. furthermore, the flow 
of government funds was to be tracked to the final service delivery point, for instance, through public 
service delivery surveys. The reporting and accountability measures also included an ex-post review of 
procurement, measures to improve disclosure of public budget information at regional, subregional 
and service delivery point, and the continuous audit of local government expenditure by the auditor 
general combined with the necessary capacity-building support for the auditor general’s staff.
Weak commission practice: Paraguay
The preparatory documents for the approval of the Commission’s gbs programme do not refer to 
fiduciary risk, although the overall conclusion of the Country financial accountability assessment of 
august 2004 was that the financial management risk is high and that, to reduce risk to an acceptable 
level, reforms were needed in the areas of internal control, external audit and the control of decen-
tralised entities. furthermore, the preparatory documents do not describe the main risks relating to 
inefficiencies and wastage of the national budget and do not address the issue of corruption in spite 
of the extent of this problem29. despite the high level of fiduciary risk, the preparatory documents 
do not demonstrate how the main weaknesses are to be tackled and no shorter-term measures were 
implemented.
28   This programme is not formally labelled a gbs programme. nevertheless its basic objectives and purpose, the large-scale transfer 
of funds with the objective of poverty reduction and through national systems using a multi-sector approach, are typical of gbs 
programmes.
29   Transparency international reports poor performance in terms of corruption perception and the situation is deteriorating.  
its Corruption perception index has listed paraguay as one of the most corrupt countries in latin america. The relative position 
improved between 2004 (140th) and 2006 (111th) but later deteriorated again: 138th place in 2007 and 2008 and 154th place in 2009. 
This perception is confirmed by an evaluation of corruption by the united states agency for international development (usaid) in 
june 2008 as well as by various interlocutors during the Court’s audit mission to paraguay.
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36.    The Commission has paid relatively little attention to the risk 
of corruption in its gbs programmes in terms of objectives, 
  capacity-building support and monitoring and generally makes 
little reference to it in its programme appraisal documenta-
tion. one reason for this is that the Commission tends to treat 
it as a wider governance issue which has led to it not being 
sufficiently addressed in the context of pfm reform efforts. 
however, in 2008 the Commission considerably increased its 
efforts to tackle corruption in uganda in conjunction with 
other donors and the european anti-fraud office. 
de v e l o p m e n t r i s k
37.  in addition to pfm systems that work, countries also need to 
have well-defined national development strategies, integrated 
with the national budgetary framework and sectoral policies, 
for gbs to be effective. a structured assessment of the strat-
egy should therefore be a significant part of the Commission’s 
work of drawing up gbs programmes. The Court found that 
national development strategies are generally described in 
Commission programming, identification and formulation 
documents but are not critically appraised and the Commis-
sion does not draw an explicit conclusion on the relevance 
and credibility of the strategy.
38.  national development strategies are generally still weak, which 
is likely to mean that development risk is relatively high. Thus 
a 2007 world bank review concluded that only eight of the 
62 developing countries (13 %) examined had a ‘largely devel-
oped’ strategy30 although it considered that all countries were 
making progress towards this. in particular the review found 
that:
in most countries, strategies were still only weakly linked  (a) 
to the budget;
many of the countries were still pursuing multiple  (b) 
  medium-term strategies, which may involve a significant 
duplication of effort and jeopardise progress on the other 
components of the development strategy;
many countries have identified goals and priorities match- (c) 
ing their specific needs but need to provide better clarifi-
cation of how to achieve these goals.
30  results-based national 
development strategies: 
assessment and challenges 
ahead, The world bank, 
december 2007. The review used 
three criteria for its assessment: 
a unified strategic framework, 
prioritisation within that 
framework and a strategic link to 
the budget.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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39.  The Commission holds considerable information on develop-
ment risks. however, these are not clearly set out in the iden-
tification and formulation documents of the gbs programmes. 
in paraguay for instance, risks include insufficient planning 
of the financial and human resources needed to implement 
the national development strategy, inappropriate institutional 
arrangements which have led to weak and inefficient poli-
cies, lack of transparency in the design and implementation 
of policies and programmes and inappropriate targeting of 
expenditure. where the Commission did identify risks, as for 
instance in uganda and vietnam, it did not make an explicit 
judgement on the level of development risk and did not sys-
tematically identify measures for reducing it.
thE commIssIon’s dEsIGn and 
ImPlEmEntatIon of thE dIffErEnt 
comPonEnts of Its GBs ProGrammEs  
do not EnsurE that thEIr PotEntIal 
ImPact Is oPtImIsEd
40.  This section addresses the question of whether the Commis-
sion’s design and implementation of the different components 
of gbs were effective, i.e. transfer of funds, capacity-building 
support, conditions and dialogue.
thE ratIonalE for thE allocatIons to 
IndIvIdual GBs ProGrammEs Is not clEar But 
thE dIsBursEmEnt of fundInG Is IncrEasInGly 
PrEdIctaBlE for thE PartnEr countrIEs
41.    The Court examined whether the Commission appraised the 
amounts of individual gbs programmes according to the ob-
jectives of the programmes and the countries’ specific circum-
stances. furthermore, it examined whether the Commission 
disburses gbs on a predictable basis and in alignment with 
country budgetary systems.26
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th e r e  is n o  F r a m e w o r k  F o r  a s s e s s i n g t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e 
a m o u n t s  F o r  gBs p r o g r a m m e s
42.  The country strategy papers and the various documents used 
for deciding on gbs programmes examined by the Court lack 
clear explanations on how the amount of gbs allocated had 
been decided. in most cases, a reference is only made to the 
overall objective of increasing the Commission’s use of budget 
support (see paragraph 7).
43.  imprecise objectives (see paragraph 22) are a problem for as-
sessing the amount to be allocated to individual gbs pro-
grammes. for example, the amount required to have an im-
pact on partner country budgetary expenditure patterns or 
to finance the budget deficit may be quite different from the 
amount required to strengthen pfm systems.
44.  The Commission does not carry out a structured assessment 
to weigh the expected benefits and risks. its internal guide-
lines stipulate that first the financial envelope for gbs must 
be established and then the expected benefits and risks aris-
ing from this allocation are to be assessed. a more logical 
approach would be to first assess the expected benefits and 
risks of a gbs programme and then determine the financial 
allocation on the basis of this assessment within the limits of 
the overall country allocations.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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45.  as regards risks, the Commission takes account of the risk of 
non-utilisation of gbs due to non-respect of the eligibility 
criteria (see paragraph 27). for the 10th edf, generally the 
lower this risk was assessed to be for a given country, the more 
gbs it was likely to receive and the higher the percentage of 
its national indicative programme allocated to gbs (see the 
Table). however, the Commission does not consider fiduciary 
and development risks (see paragraphs 32 and 37) when decid-
ing on the amount of funding.
lInk BEtWEEn GBs allocatIons and thE commIssIon’s 
assEssmEnt of rIsk of non-utIlIsatIon of GBs duE to  
thE non-rEsPEct of thE ElIGIBIlIty crItErIa
LOW RISK MEDIUM RISK HIGH RISK
Number of ACP countries with budget support programmes 
planned in their national indicative programme for the 10th EDF 20 14 8
Number of ACP countries with no budget support programmes 
planned in their national indicative programme for the 10th EDF1 0 8 18
Budget support as a 
percentage of the national 
indicative programme for  
the 10th EDF
Average 73,0 % 63,2 % 35,0 %
Lowest 48,1 % 39,6 % 19,9 %
Highest 89,4 % 95,3 % 84,7 %
1   no risk assessment was made for nine aCp countries because they are relatively small or do not benefit from the edfs.
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th e  co m m i s s i o n  d i s B u r s e s gBs o n  a p r e d i c t a B l e  B a s i s a n d 
in a l i g n m e n t  w i t h  c o u n t r y  s y s t e m s
46.  by definition, a central part of budget support is the transfer 
of funds by the Commission to support the national budget 
of the beneficiary country. in recent years, best practice in 
the provision of budget support has emphasised the impor-
tance to partner countries of the predictability of the flows 
of budget support allocated by donors. This allows partner 
countries to know sufficiently in advance the amount and tim-
ing of disbursements.
47.  The predictability of the Commission’s disbursement of gbs is 
generally good. in most countries, the disbursement is sched-
uled to take place in the year after the performance assess-
ment which allows the partner country to include the gbs as 
planned revenue in its budget. in most cases where payments 
have been made late, it was because of delays on the part of 
beneficiary countries in the submission of disbursement re-
quests and did not result in significant negative impacts.
48.  in particular, the Commission has taken significant steps to 
improve predictability through the introduction of the mdg 
contracts31. These programmes commit funds for a six-year 
period instead of the typical three years and, if eligibility con-
ditions continue to be met, allow the disbursement of at least 
70 % of the total commitment independent of performance. 
mdg contracts are only granted to countries that have a suc-
cessful track record in implementing budget support, show a 
commitment to monitoring and achieving the mdgs, and have 
active donor coordination mechanisms to support perform-
ance review and dialogue.
31  The name intends to 
highlight the contractual nature 
of the long-term financial 
commitments and its focus on 
mdg-related results, notably in 
health and education.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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caPacIty-BuIldInG suPPort has madE usEful 
contrIButIons But Was oftEn not BasEd on 
an aPProPrIatE assEssmEnt of PrIorIty nEEds
49.  Capacity-building support is one of the key components of 
gbs programmes and is either included directly in the gbs 
programme or through an accompanying specific capacity-
building support programme to contribute to gbs programme 
objectives. Typically about 5 % of overall gbs programme 
funding is set aside for capacity-building.
50.  This section addresses the question of whether capacity-build-
ing support provided within the context of gbs programmes 
effectively contributes to meeting the programmes’ objectives. 
The Court examined whether capacity-building support is rel-
evant, sufficient and clearly defined in view of the programme 
objectives and the interventions made by other donors. fur-
thermore, it examined whether capacity-building support has 
been implemented appropriately.
ca p a c i t y-Building s u p p o r t  m a y  n o t  B e s u F F i c i e n t a n d  m a y 
n o t  B e t h e  m o s t  r e l e v a n t
51.  despite the importance of capacity-building support, the Com-
mission has no criteria or guidelines to assess the capacity-
building support required to address the partner country’s 
priority needs. The assessments of capacity-building needs 
are not comprehensive and do not systematically take into 
account support provided by other donors when the Commis-
sion decides on the capacity-building allocations under gbs 
programmes32.
52.  improving pfm is an important objective of all the Commis-
sion’s gbs programmes (see paragraph 18) and capacity-build-
ing can play an important role in reducing risk. The Commis-
sion’s capacity-building support therefore mainly focuses on 
pfm. however, there is no clear link between the needs for 
improving pfm in a particular country and the amounts pro-
vided for capacity-building support. it is therefore not clear 
that the share of gbs programme funding allocated to capac-
ity-building, usually in the order of 5 %, is sufficient to have 
a significant impact.
32  see also paragraphs 10 and 
11 of the Court’s special report 
no 6/2007 on the effectiveness 
of technical assistance in 
the context of capacity 
development.30
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53.  only a limited part of the capacity-building for pfm has been 
used for strengthening oversight bodies such as supreme au-
dit institutions, parliaments and civil society organisations 
seeking to monitor government use of budgetary resources33. 
support for capacity-building in areas other than pfm, on 
which gbs programme objectives are also focused, notably 
health and education, has been very relevant but in general 
marginal.
54.  in some cases, capacity-building support was used to finance 
assistance for the management of gbs programmes. as a re-
sult, these funds did not directly contribute to the creation of 
sustainable capacity in the partner country. in nicaragua, tech-
nical assistance mostly focused on the production of reports, 
monitoring of conditions, preparing disbursement requests 
and the review of the government’s plans. similarly, in benin, 
more than a third of the funds available for capacity-building 
support under the ninth edf were devoted to the assessment 
of indicators, the preparation of joint annual reviews, the for-
mulation of the gbs programme under the 10th edf and the 
design of capacity-building support for pfm and statistics.
55.  in july 2008, the Commission adopted a strategy34 that aimed 
to improve the effectiveness of its assistance for capacity de-
velopment by requiring it to support country-led programmes, 
be based on partner demand and be focused on sustainable 
results. improvements were observed in the design of the 
capacity-building support under programmes launched after 
the adoption of the strategy. The capacity-building support 
provided under the 10th edf in benin and uganda is delivered 
through multi-donor trust funds and is, compared to the ninth 
edf, more relevant to the priority needs, better planned and 
better coordinated with other donors. it remains unclear, how-
ever, how the amounts for support through such mechanisms 
were established.
33  special report no 2/2005 
concerning edf budget 
aid to aCp countries: the 
Commission’s management of 
the public finance reform aspect 
(paragraphs 56 to 62). The Court 
recommended that relations 
with parliaments and supreme 
audit institutions should be 
strengthened.
34  a backbone strategy — 
reforming technical cooperation 
and project implementation 
units for external aid provided by 
the european Commission.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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th e  s u p p o r t  p r o v i d e d  m a d e  u s e F u l  c o n t r i B u t i o n s  t o 
c a p a c i t y-Building B u t  a signiFicant p a r t o F  t h e  F u n d s 
a v a i l a B l e h a s  n o t  B e e n c o m m i t t e d
56.  Capacity-building support has made useful contributions, es-
pecially when support was provided in response to a clear 
demand from the partner country. in the area of pfm, support 
is mostly related to government pfm reforms in fields such 
as the budgetary process, internal control, procurement and 
the quality of statistical information. in those cases where 
capacity-building support focused on other sectors, it covered 
areas such as the formulation of national and sector strategies, 
the development of sector management information systems, 
monitoring and evaluation (see Box 3).
caPacIty-BuIldInG suPPort
Good commission practice: laos
The Commission has devoted a significant share (approximately 20 %) of its gbs-related funding to 
capacity-building which reflects the capacity constraints of the government. The programme focuses on 
pfm weaknesses but also seeks to build capacity in the provision of social services which is relevant to 
the Commission’s objective of improving performance in the health and education sectors. The technical 
assistance objectives include facilitating sector dialogue between ministries and development part-
ners and helping the government to achieve the performance indicator targets linked to the variable 
tranches of the gbs programme. Thus synergies were created between different components of gbs, 
namely capacity-building support on the one hand and dialogue and conditions on the other hand.
Weak commission practice: Benin 
The capacity-building support to be provided in the framework of the ninth edf gbs programme rep-
resents approximately 2 % of the programme financing and is not clearly defined in terms of needs, 
objectives, priorities and planning. There is no documented view on what improvement could and 
should be made within the period of the programme and how capacity-building support will contribute 
to this. There is no needs assessment and no justification of why certain areas have been selected to be 
supported and why some, such as anti-corruption measures and administrative reform, have not, even 
though they were identified by the poverty reduction strategy as relevant to contributing to good pfm. 
There is also a separate specific programme to support the reform of public management by objec-
tives. This programme addresses relevant weaknesses but the articulation with the gbs programme is 
unclear. The results of the support provided have been variable, as some of the support provided did 
not lead to an actual improvement of systems.
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57.  for most gbs programmes, funds allocated to capacity-build-
ing support have in the end been only partially committed, 
thus reducing the effectiveness of this component of gbs 
programmes. in fact, on average, only approximately 60 % 
of capacity-building allocations are committed before the 
closure of the programmes. This is in part because the pro-
gramme implementation period is often too short to design 
and fully implement their capacity-building component. This 
problem has been exacerbated by difficulties in first defining 
needs and then delays in the implementation of the capacity-
building activities. Thus the Court found significant delays in 
the launching of the capacity-building actions in four of the 
six countries. however, such implementation difficulties are 
not specific to the capacity-building support provided by gbs 
programmes35.
thE condItIons attachEd to dIsBursEmEnt 
arE PErformancE orIEntEd But In PractIcE 
arE not WorkInG as IntEndEd
58.  Conditions attached to the disbursement of gbs comprise gen-
eral conditions relating to eligibility for budget support which 
have to be met before the payment of any fixed or variable 
tranche, and specific conditions mainly linked to the variable 
tranche mechanism connected to the achievement of perform-
ance indicator targets36. The variable tranche mechanism is a 
particular feature of the Commission’s budget support pro-
grammes and reflects the growing emphasis in development 
cooperation on managing for results. as an incentive, the 
amount disbursed from the variable tranches depend on the 
extent to which targets for selected performance indicators 
have been reached.
59.  The Court examined whether conditions attached to the dis-
bursement of gbs programmes are relevant in relation to their 
objectives, provide an incentive to the government to achieve 
the objectives and allow the objective assessment of progress 
achieved.
35  see the Court’s special report 
no 6/2007 on the effectiveness 
of technical assistance in 
the context of capacity 
development.
36  fixed tranches sometimes 
also have one or two additional 
conditions attached to 
them normally requiring the 
government to carry out specific 
actions.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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co n d i t i o n s  a r e g e n e r a l l y r e l e v a n t  B u t  a r e u n l i ke l y t o 
a c h i e v e  t h e i r  incentive e F F e c t
60.    The general conditions attached to the payment of any fixed 
or variable tranche are relevant since they are aligned with the 
country’s objectives of maintaining macroeconomic stability 
and making progress in relation to sound pfm and poverty 
reduction. in some cases there is scope for improvement in 
the identification of priority pfm measures to be implement-
ed37. The specific conditions attached to the variable tranches 
of gbs programmes are also generally relevant as they are 
aligned with the national development priorities of the part-
ner country (see Box 4). The Commission is increasingly taking 
over performance indicators from the country’s national devel-
opment strategy. in some programmes, the Commission used 
indicators focused on poorer regions in the partner countries 
or which were broken down by gender in order to increase 
their relevance to poverty reduction priorities.
61.  The Court found that the incentive effect of the variable 
tranche mechanism was likely to be less than intended. it was 
often difficult to set appropriate targets for the performance 
indicators. Targets that are insufficiently challenging or tar-
gets that are overly ambitious can reduce the incentive effect. 
moreover, reliable statistical data to establish clear baselines 
and to provide information on past trends are often not avail-
able (see paragraph 67). 
62.  furthermore, the Commission’s documentation did not dem-
onstrate that there had been sufficient analysis during the 
target-setting process of what reforms and additional budg-
etary resources would be necessary and feasible in order to 
achieve the targets. since proposals for targets increasingly 
come from the country itself, the Commission has to hold in-
depth dialogue with the national authorities to ensure that 
targets are not set deliberately low or unrealistically high. 
however, there is insufficient expertise for this in many Com-
mission delegations (see paragraph 74). in addition, occasion-
ally targets were not set until well into the year for which 
performance was being measured.
37  see paragraph 46 of the 
Court’s annual report on the 
activities funded by the seventh, 
eighth, ninth and 10th european 
development funds (edfs) for 
the financial year 2008.34
special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
sElEctIon of condItIons
Good commission practice: nicaragua
The gbs programme in nicaragua focuses on rural areas and selected social indicators, private sector in-
dicators and pfm indicators. The three social indicators of the programme are relevant to the objectives 
of the poverty reduction strategy papers since they address some of the causes of poverty identified 
in this national strategy. The four private sector indicators of the programme relate to the issue of land 
tenancy and productive capacity and this is consistent with the priority given by the poverty reduction 
strategy papers to investments in rural areas and the need to enhance the link between production, 
competitiveness and land development in order to reduce poverty. one of the two pfm indicators is 
relevant to the recommendations of the pfm action plan. furthermore, the Commission’s selection of 
indicators has taken account of the complementarities with two sbs programmes.
Weak commission practice: Benin
The relevance of the performance indicators is affected by a number of weaknesses.
all targets for 2005 relating to the education sector were achieved, providing the impression of    ο
a good performance by the sector but the joint annual review38 for that year concluded that the 
implementation of reforms in this sector was unsatisfactory.
Two of the four indicators that relate to the health sector measure the frequency of visits to health    ο
centres. however, a government priority was preventive action against malaria, which is likely to 
have an adverse effect on the indicators. as a result, the Commission had to exclude these indica-
tors from the calculation of the variable tranche amount for the year 2006.
The pfm indicators do not address the main needs of the pfm reform process. according to the    ο
conclusions of the joint annual reviews as well as of the pefa assessment, improvements were most 
needed in the areas of external control, financial accountability and tax collection. This was also 
the view of the Commission’s internal quality review for the formulation of the gbs programme 
under the 10th edf. however, this programme does not contain a condition concerning the fiscal 
collection rate and includes only one condition on external control for the variable tranche of 2009 
which was not kept for the rest of the programme.
38  This is a yearly review of the performance of the government by cooperation donors and the government of the partner country.
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63.  in uganda half of the gbs targets relating to the health sec-
tor were set either below or much above the baseline without 
explanation. in laos and paraguay a number of the targets 
set were not very challenging, sometimes simply being set at 
the same level as the baseline. in nicaragua the government 
acknowledged that for many targets there was no adequate 
accompanying budget.
64.  a further factor influencing the incentive effect of the variable 
tranche is the proportion of the gbs programme allocated to 
it. The Commission has no criteria for deciding on the alloca-
tion of funds between fixed and variable tranches, which leads 
to significant differences between regions and countries in the 
proportions allocated39. indeed the mix of fixed and variable 
tranches can also vary significantly between two consecutive 
programmes in the same country and without a clear explana-
tion being given for this change. The Commission considers 
that the proportion of gbs allocated to the variable tranche 
should be higher in countries where it has more concerns 
about their commitment to poverty reduction and reforms. 
however, this approach is not referred to in the Commission’s 
internal guidelines or individual programme documents. fur-
thermore, in a significant number of the gbs programmes, 
particularly in asian and latin american countries, variable 
tranches are not used.
65.  some financing agreements also contain provisions to the ef-
fect that, when variable tranche performance indicators are 
not achieved, the Commission may pay out undisbursed funds 
at the end of the programme if new conditions are met. such 
a possibility was provided for under gbs programmes in be-
nin, nicaragua and paraguay. in other cases undisbursed funds 
were reallocated to other Commission programmes or projects 
in the country.
39  variable tranche allocations 
range between 10 % and 91 % 
of the total amounts of gbs 
programmes in aCp countries 
and between 23 % and 54 % for 
programmes in asian and latin 
american countries.36
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it is o F t e n  d i F F i c u l t t o a s s e s s w h e t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s   
h a v e  B e e n m e t  o r  n o t
66.  The general conditions for gbs disbursements are often 
vaguely defined, being based on ‘satisfactory’ performance 
by partner governments in implementing national develop-
ment strategies, pfm reform and macroeconomic management. 
no specific milestones or outputs are established to serve as 
criteria for what constitutes ‘satisfactory’. as observed by the 
Court’s annual reports on the activities funded by the seventh, 
eighth, ninth and 10th edfs40, the Commission often concludes 
that progress on the reform of pfm has been ‘satisfactory’  
while having only limited evidence to support this position. 
This approach tends to reflect the Commission’s concern to 
ensure the continuity of its programmes, although it should be 
acknowledged that the Commission has improved its analysis 
in this area since the start of the 10th edf.
67.  unreliable data can make it difficult to assess whether con-
ditions based on performance indicator targets have been 
achieved or not. The world bank’s 2007 review of ‘results-
based national development strategies’ highlighted weak sta-
tistical systems as a major challenge faced by nearly all the 
62 countries it examined. The problem is aggravated by the 
fact that the Commission sets its variable tranche performance 
indicator targets on an annual basis although year-on-year 
progress in some areas can only realistically be expected in 
terms of small percentage increases. such small increases are 
difficult to measure reliably.
40  see paragraphs 19 and 46 of 
the Court’s annual report on the 
activities funded by the seventh, 
eighth, ninth and   10th european 
development funds (edfs) 
for the financial year 2008 and 
paragraph 34 of the Court’s 
annual report on the activities 
funded by the eighth, ninth and 
10th european development 
funds (edfs) for the financial 
year 2009.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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dIaloGuE WIth PartnEr countrIEs Is not usEd 
to Its full PotEntIal
68.  one of the main benefits of budget support is the increased op-
portunities it can give donors for dialogue with governments 
on national policies. dialogue can also play a very important 
role in helping to achieve the objectives of gbs programmes, 
since it allows the Commission to discuss with governments 
the definition and implementation of the key policy objectives 
supported by the programmes. dialogue is also intended to be 
a key part of the Commission’s results-oriented approach to 
budget support since the Commission uses it in conjunction 
with the conditions and targets set to review the government’s 
performance. dialogue typically takes place both at the policy 
level and at the technical level and is carried out jointly with 
other donors. 
69.  The Court examined whether the Commission manages its dia-
logue with the partner country in a manner that contributes 
to meeting the expected results of gbs programmes. for this 
purpose, it examined whether the objectives and modalities 
of dialogue were clearly defined and appropriate, whether 
the Commission actively participated in the dialogue at an 
appropriate level and in accordance with the modalities laid 
down and whether the Commission’s contribution to dialogue 
has adequately addressed key aspects of poverty reduction 
and pfm.
th e r e  is n o  a p p r o p r i a t e F r a m e w o r k  t o e n s u r e   
e F F e c t i v e d i a l o g u e 
70.  in most countries where gbs is provided, joint donor agree-
ments have been established between donors and with partner 
countries to lay down common principles and procedures for 
conducting dialogue and the Commission actively supports 
and participates in such arrangements. nevertheless the Com-
mission has not yet developed the detailed guidance neces-
sary to help ensure that within such frameworks its staff make 
full use of opportunities for dialogue.38
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71.  The Commission’s internal guidelines provide little informa-
tion on what the objectives and content of dialogue should 
be or on how to undertake and document dialogue at the vari-
ous stages of the programme cycle. They do, however, require 
‘an appropriate dialogue strategy’ to be put in place when 
weaknesses affecting key aspects of the gbs programme are 
identified. in practice, such strategies have not been drawn up 
despite the useful role they could play in all gbs programmes 
in helping to systematically improve effective dialogue by fix-
ing clear objectives and modalities and defining the necessary 
staff resources needed to conduct the dialogue.
72.  The extent to which gbs programmes have established a sound 
basis for dialogue has varied. in laos and vietnam the objec-
tives and modalities of dialogue were clearly laid out in the 
annual cycle of the world bank-led poverty reduction strategy 
programmes to which the Commission gbs programmes con-
tributed, with the dialogue focusing on reforms to be intro-
duced by the national governments. in contrast there was   little 
detailed information in uganda and paraguay on what the 
specific aims of the Commission’s dialogue would be during 
the course of the programme and in paraguay the modalities 
to be applied to pursue them were also less clear. in benin, 
significant progress was made in this respect in the 10th edf 
compared to the ninth edf.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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th e  co m m i s s i o n ’s i n v o l v e m e n t  in d i a l o g u e  v a r i e s  
B u t  is o F t e n  limited
73.  gbs programmes have been particularly important in enab-
ling the Commission to conduct a dialogue on the national 
budget and pfm and the Commission’s contribution to gbs 
dialogue is generally more developed in this area. The results 
of pefa assessments (see paragraph 31) have often played a 
catalytic role in strengthening pfm dialogue. in the other ar-
eas on which gbs programme objectives are typically focused, 
the Commission’s dialogue is in many cases limited to issues 
relating to assessing compliance with the variable tranche 
and fixed tranche conditions of the programme rather than 
addressing overall government performance in the areas con-
cerned. as a result, the Commission often does not play the 
role in dialogue that could be expected, given its significant 
financial contributions (see Box 5).
dIaloGuE
Good commission practice: vietnam
in vietnam, the Commission provides gbs within the framework of the world bank poverty reduction 
support credits, which is the gbs mechanism used by all donors in vietnam. it is a clear framework for 
dialogue between the donor community, led by the world bank and the government. it involves an 
annual cycle whereby all co-financers jointly define, monitor, and evaluate conditions with the govern-
ment. for its dialogue, the Commission targets a limited number of areas which reflects its efforts to 
respect the eu Code of Conduct on division of labour in development policy.
Weak commission practice: Paraguay 
The objective of the gbs programme in paraguay is to support the implementation of the social pro-
tection network which is a significant element in the social protection axis of the national poverty 
reduction strategy. following the major political change after the elections, dialogue took place in a 
particular political context. There is no structured framework in place for dialogue with donor coor-
dination mechanisms such as working groups or joint annual reviews to discuss in detail the imple-
mentation of the national poverty reduction strategy. The Commission has concentrated its dialogue 
on the government’s compliance with the indicators used for the variable tranches. as a result, it paid 
little attention to the overall implementation of the social protection network and did not seize the 
opportunity for a wider debate on the quality of social services. in fact, the Commission’s limited moni-
toring of the implementation of the social protection network and the pfm action plan places limits 
on the possible extent of the dialogue. This means that inadequate performance is not detected early 
enough to allow a timely response through dialogue. when indicators were not achieved or when they 
were met with a much larger margin than would normally be expected, the Commission did not seek 
explanations from the government, nor did it question the reliability of the statistics.
BoX 540
special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
74.  a key factor affecting the quality of dialogue is the capacity 
of the Commission staff involved. an important reason for the 
Commission not having made full use of the opportunities for 
dialogue provided by gbs has been insufficient expertise in 
many Commission delegations in the priority areas covered 
by the gbs programme objectives. in its 2007 annual report 
on the edfs (paragraph 33), the Court indicated that ‘the in-
crease of budget support … creates the need for specific skills 
and knowledge, and the Court notes that europeaid’s inter-
nal audit Capability (iaC) has recommended that a human 
resources policy is developed to incorporate objectives on 
numbers, skills and knowledge of budget support staff’.
75.  while the Commission has generally made pfm dialogue a pri-
ority, it has been difficult to recruit pfm specialists because 
of the relatively limited expertise available in this area. The 
Commission has made efforts to overcome this problem by de-
veloping several pfm-related training courses. a lower priority 
tended to be given to ensuring there was adequate staffing to 
contribute to health and education sector dialogue despite the 
Commission systematically including objectives for these two 
areas in its gbs programmes41. Thus the delegation in benin 
did have pfm specialists but had no staff specialised in health 
and education which meant it did not attend the health and 
education working groups42 and can only to a limited extent 
participate in the joint annual reviews43.
76.    The letters sent by the Commission to governments to inform 
them what amount from the variable tranches is to be dis-
bursed are used as part of the dialogue. The Commission in-
cludes in these letters relevant messages on issues of concern 
regarding the continued eligibility of the gbs programme, the 
implementation of the gbs programme and the performance 
of the government in the areas focused upon by the gbs pro-
gramme. in some countries, however, this opportunity was not 
used at all (e.g. paraguay) or only partially (e.g. benin).
41  see the Court’s special report 
no 10/2008 on eC development 
assistance to health services in 
sub-saharan africa, paragraphs 
18 and 41.
42  working groups monitor 
performance within sectors 
and consist of donors and 
representatives of the national 
authorities.
43  joint annual reviews 
are yearly reviews of the 
performance of the government 
by cooperation donors and 
the government of the partner 
country.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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44  except for the requirement 
for payment files to report on 
important deteriorations in 
the dialogue with the national 
authorities, the Commission’s 
internal guidelines do not 
provide for any specific reporting 
on the gbs-related dialogue 
undertaken.
45  hereafter simply referred to as 
‘annual reports’.
46  in addition, the Commission 
is associated with other 
reports, which, however, are 
not produced under its sole 
responsibility and do not 
necessarily reflect its views. The 
Court considered that it was not 
appropriate to include them in 
its examination. examples of 
such reports are the joint annual 
reports it produces with each 
of the aCp partner countries as 
well as reports of evaluations 
of the european Commission’s 
cooperation with specific 
partner countries.
77.  despite the importance of dialogue, the Commission’s internal 
reporting on dialogue undertaken specifically in the context 
of its gbs programmes is limited44. The Commission’s inter-
nal management reporting from delegations to europeaid’s 
headquarters is mainly limited to general comments on the 
state of political dialogue concerning the overall coopera-
tion programme. This lack of information and the absence of 
clear objectives for the Commission’s dialogue on gbs (see 
paragraph 71), makes it difficult for the Commission to assess 
and demonstrate the extent to which dialogue has effectively 
contributed to gbs programme objectives.
thE commIssIon’s rEPortInG to EXtErnal 
stakEholdErs tEnds to focus on thE 
PotEntIal BEnEfIts of GBs rathEr than  
on rEsults
78.  The main Commission documents for reporting on its exter-
nal cooperation, including gbs, are its annual reports on the 
‘european Community’s development and external assistance 
policies and their implementation’45. in 2008, the Commission 
also published two documents dedicated to the subject of 
budget support, one entitled ‘budget support — a question 
of mutual trust’ and the second ‘budget support — The effec-
tive way to finance development?’. in addition, it produces 
information notes for the edf and development cooperation 
instrument management committees composed of member 
state representatives46.
79.  The Court examined the Commission’s reporting on its gbs 
programmes to assess whether it reported in a clear, exhaus-
tive and accurate way on them, in particular in relation to their 
effectiveness, potential benefits and risks, and implementa-
tion challenges. The Court focused on the Commission’s annual 
reports over the period 2001–09.42
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EXtErnal rEPortInG focusEs on thE 
PotEntIal BEnEfIts of GBs
80.  The annual reports regularly contain information describing 
the Commission’s procedures for managing budget support 
and new developments in the design of the instrument. They 
also provide details of the funding committed under budget 
support. in addition, they give considerable coverage to the 
potential benefits of budget support.
81.    The Commission has regularly used the annual reports to ex-
plain the potential benefits of budget support such as align-
ment of assistance with national policies and systems, stronger 
ownership, improved opportunities for dialogue, better donor 
harmonisation, greater aid predictability and lower transac-
tion costs. however, the reports tend not to emphasise the 
fact that the benefits described are only potential. in reality, 
many of them can at most be only partially realised because 
the necessary conditions in the beneficiary country are not 
yet fully in place, in particular due to continued weaknesses 
in national development plans and public finance manage-
ment systems (see paragraphs 26, 29 and 38). similarly the 
Commission itself often does not have the capacity to fully 
take advantage of the potential benefits, notably where its 
delegations do not have sufficient expertise to make full use 
of the improved opportunities for dialogue which budget sup-
port offers (see paragraph 74).
82.    following the 2005 paris declaration on aid effectiveness, the 
Commission’s annual reports have emphasised budget sup-
port’s role in increasing ‘aid effectiveness’47. however, the 
reports do not make a clear distinction between the ‘aid ef-
fectiveness’ targeted by the paris declaration — by which is 
meant improving delivery of aid by following the core princi-
ples of the paris declaration — and ‘aid effectiveness’ in terms 
of the ultimate impact of the assistance on reducing poverty. 
using budget support as a means to adhere more closely to 
the principles of the paris declaration is no guarantee that the 
aid has been effective in contributing to improving the lives 
of poor people.
47  The paris declaration 
identifies actions to reform 
the ways aid is delivered and 
managed with the ultimate 
objective of increasing the 
impact of aid. it lays down five 
core principles which it considers 
should be followed in the 
management of aid if its impact 
is to be increased: ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, 
managing for results, and mutual 
accountability.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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83.  in view of the potential role that budget support could play 
in delivering aid in line with the principles of the paris dec-
laration, the european union committed itself to a target of 
channelling 50 % of its government-to-government assistance 
through country systems (see paragraph 7). moreover, the per-
centage of aid channelled through budget support is used as 
a results indicator in the europeaid annual work programmes. 
on this basis, an important feature of the annual reports’ cov-
erage of budget support is to highlight progress towards this 
quantitative target, although an increase in the use of budget 
support does not necessarily mean an increase in its effective-
ness in terms of poverty reduction.
EXtErnal rEPortInG GIvEs lIttlE InformatIon 
on rIsks, ImPlEmEntatIon challEnGEs and 
actual EffEctIvEnEss
84.    The annual reports’ coverage of the actual results of budget 
support is considerably less than their commentary on its 
potential benefits and increased usage. The lack of informa-
tion in the annual reports on the results of budget support 
contrasts with the information on other forms of aid which 
the Commission obtains from the ‘results-oriented monitor-
ing system’ it has developed to carry out annual assessments 
of projects. The Commission has no other internal reporting 
procedures for systematically assessing the poverty reduc-
tion results of its gbs programmes which could then be used 
for external reporting purposes. There is no equivalent to the 
delegation annual pfm reports (see paragraph 31) for report-
ing on progress in achieving objectives related to poverty 
reduction. The six-monthly external assistance management 
reports (eamr) produced by delegations for europeaid focus 
on implementation status rather than results. 44
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85.  The most substantial feedback related to the results of gbs was 
given in the 2007 annual report. This provided an overview of 
the findings of the 2006 joint evaluation of gbs, which was 
the first major evaluation of gbs carried out. however, while 
setting out the evaluation’s assessment that gbs had had a 
positive effect on policy and pfm processes, the annual report 
also noted that ‘most of the effects of gbs inputs so far have 
been on access to services, rather than income poverty and 
empowerment of the poor’. in its 2009 annual report, the Com-
mission recognised the limitations of this evaluation which 
‘fell short of evaluating results’.
86.  it is of concern that there is no established evaluation meth-
odology resulting in a body of evaluation work which pro-
vides evidence on whether, and in what circumstances, budget 
support can make an effective contribution to poverty reduc-
tion. The difficulties encountered by the 2006 evaluation were 
partly linked to the fundamental challenge in evaluating the 
effectiveness of budget support, which is how to attribute im-
provements in development outcomes specifically to budget 
support. This is because donor budget support is merged with 
national budgets, and therefore cannot be separately identi-
fied, and because improved outcomes may be due to exter-
nal factors as well as the government programmes to which 
budget support contributes. 
87.  since the 2006 joint evaluation, the Commission has been at 
the forefront of donor efforts within the framework of the 
development assistance Committee of the organisation for 
economic Cooperation and development evaluation network 
to develop an improved evaluation methodology which is in-
tended to better address the question of the impact of budg-
et support. at the end of 2009 three pilot evaluations were 
launched at country level of which two were being led by the 
Commission.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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88.  an important intermediate objective of gbs, on which it would 
also be useful to obtain information, is to contribute to improv-
ing public finance management in partner countries. ensuring 
that pfm systems effectively transfer budgetary resources for 
pro-poor expenditure is an essential part of achieving overall 
poverty reduction objectives. however, although the Commis-
sion has developed a system of annual internal reporting by 
delegations on pfm issues, these reports do not assess the 
achievement of the pfm objectives of gbs programmes. This 
means that there is again little information available for ex-
ternal reporting on the achievement of gbs pfm objectives, 
which explains why there is also limited coverage of this issue 
in the annual reports.
89.  a central risk with budget support, particularly in a context 
of weak public finance management and often significant lev-
els of corruption, is that the budget of the recipient country 
will not be used for the intended purpose of poverty reduc-
tion. however, the annual reports tend to give little attention 
to this issue. indeed the foreword to the 2009 annual report 
stated in reference to the largest beneficiaries of budget sup-
port that they had ‘demonstrated the reliability of their public 
finances’. The annual reports again focus more on the potential 
benefits of budget support for developing pfm systems than 
on the risk that weak pfm systems will lead to budget support 
not achieving its poverty reduction-related objectives. 
90.  in addressing pfm issues in the context of budget support, 
the Commission’s annual report has made frequent reference 
to the development of the pefa framework as a diagnostic 
tool for pfm. as already noted (see paragraph 31), pefa in-
deed plays a useful role in highlighting areas where countries 
need to improve pfm, and measuring those improvements over 
time. however, a more balanced presentation of pefa’s role 
would also recognise its limitations and that it is not in itself 
a risk assessment tool.46
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91.  The Commission’s annual reports have also not addressed 
the key challenges it faces in its management of gbs, which 
are raised in this Court’s report such as the disadvantages 
as well as the advantages of the Commission’s results-based 
conditions, the capacity of its staff to make full use of the 
opportunities offered by gbs for dialogue, and the relevance 
and effectiveness of technical cooperation linked to gbs pro-
grammes.
92.  The european parliament in its discharge report on the edf 
for the financial year 2007 stressed the need for Commission 
reporting on budget support to be based on ‘analytical and 
evaluative and not only descriptive information’48. more gen-
erally it called for the Commission to base its approach on 
‘reality and conclusive evidence’ rather than ‘rhetoric’49. in its 
follow-up report the Commission undertook to provide more 
in-depth coverage of budget support issues in future annual 
reports.
48  european parliament report 
on discharge in respect of the 
implementation of the budget 
of the seventh, eighth and 
ninth european development 
funds for the financial year 
2007, Committee on budgetary 
Control, rapporteur: boguslaw 
liberadzki, a6-0159/2009, 
paragraph 42.
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ovErall conclusIons
93.  providing aid through gbs has various potential benefits in 
terms of aid delivery. as with other aid modalities, the ulti-
mate impact of gbs on poverty reduction depends, however, 
on the specific circumstances in each country. it also depends 
on effective Commission management of its gbs programmes. 
The Court found that, whilst the Commission has made consid-
erable efforts over the last decade to develop its approach to 
providing aid through gbs, there are still weaknesses in the 
methodology and the management of gbs programmes in aCp, 
latin american and asian countries, which are thus less likely 
to reach their full potential effectiveness.
94.  it must be acknowledged that the Commission’s gbs pro-
grammes are designed and implemented in coordination with 
other donors and that many deficiencies found by the Court 
are not specific to the Commission. other supreme audit insti-
tutions, such as the uk national audit office50 and the swed-
ish national audit office51, have made similar observations 
concerning the management of gbs by their donor agencies. 
however, the Commission has sole responsibility for taking 
financing decisions and is accountable to the discharge au-
thority for the management of its gbs programmes.
95.  The Commission is aware of the need to improve its manage-
ment of gbs and launched, at the end of 2009, a revision of 
its internal guidelines which aims to address most of the is-
sues raised by the Court. a key aspect that is not currently 
being addressed is the need for the Commission to improve 
its reporting to external stakeholders. whilst it is encouraging 
that the Commission has embarked on this revision process, 
whether it is ultimately effective will depend on results. it re-
mains a challenge for the Commission to draw up appropriate 
guidelines and have them applied effectively and consistently 
by all Commission staff. it will require a strong commitment 
at all levels, a clear timetable, further efforts to train the staff 
concerned, strengthened support to delegations and thorough 
monitoring of compliance with the revised guidelines.
50  department for international 
development — providing 
budget support to developing 
countries, report by the 
Comptroller and auditor 
general, 8 february 2008.
51  aid through budget 
support — The government’s 
and sida’s handling of a key type 
of development aid.
ConClusions and 
reCommendaTions48
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sPEcIfIc conclusIons and 
rEcommEndatIons
96.  whilst a positive feature is the systematic inclusion of macro-
economic and pfm objectives and some improvement has been 
noted in more recent programmes concerning the definition 
of objectives, objectives are insufficiently tailored to the spe-
cific circumstances of the country and often not precise. in 
addition, the objectives do not take into account the staff 
resources available to delegations.
The Commission should tailor the objectives of its budget 
support programme to the specific circumstances of the 
partner country. in doing so, the Commission should:
ensure complementarity between gbs and other Com- (a) 
mission support programmes in the country;
more focus on specific areas within the overall nation- (b) 
al priorities where the Commission can have the most 
value added;
set out objectives that are sufficiently precise, measur- (c) 
able and time-bound to allow monitoring of progress 
and the assessment of achievements;
clearly spell out the logic of intervention by making  (d) 
explicit the link between the objectives and the design 
of the various components of the gbs programme.
rEcommEndatIon 1
sElEctIon and formulatIon of oBjEctIvEs and 
EXPEctEd rEsults of GBs ProGrammEsspecial report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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97.  The Commission’s dynamic interpretation of eligibility condi-
tions involves high risks that funding is not used efficiently 
and effectively by the partner countries. however, the Com-
mission’s risk management framework for its gbs programmes 
is not well developed and risks are not managed in an appro-
priate manner.
The Commission should strengthen its risk management to 
give eu funds better protection against leakage, waste and 
inefficiency. in doing so, the Commission should:
perform a structured and explicit assessment of fidu- (a) 
ciary and development risks at the outset of the gbs 
programmes and update it regularly during programme 
implementation;
as a basis for fiduciary risk assessment: (b) 
make better use of information already available,    ο
notably pefa and Cpia assessments, information 
on budget implementation, reports by supreme au-
dit institutions and parliaments, and information 
from civil society organisations;
make greater use of other tools such as public    ο
expenditure tracking surveys, public expenditure 
reviews and reports on corruption;
as a basis for development risk assessment, perform a  (c) 
thorough assessment of the relevance and credibility of 
the national development strategy including its cred-
ibility in respect of its links with the budget and main 
sector policies;
build into the conditions, dialogue and capacity-build- (d) 
ing support an appropriate range of precise measures 
to monitor and reduce the main risks identified within 
a specific timeframe, including shorter-term measures 
where pfm systems are particularly weak.
rEcommEndatIon 2
manaGEmEnt of thE maIn rIsks to thE 
EffEctIvEnEss of GBs ProGrammEs50
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98.  The design and implementation of the four components of gbs 
programmes, i.e. funding, capacity-building support, condi-
tions and dialogue, do not ensure that their potential impact 
is optimised.
disbursements are made in a predictable manner and in  (a) 
alignment with the countries’ budgetary systems, but the 
rationale followed to determine the amounts to be com-
mitted to individual gbs programmes is not clear.
Capacity-building support is useful in strengthening pfm  (b) 
but is often not based on an appropriate assessment of 
priority needs and is only partially delivered because of 
delays in implementation. however, in 2008 the Commis-
sion adopted a strategy that aimed to improve the effec-
tiveness of its capacity-building support.
The Commission’s approach to performance-based con- (c) 
ditions for disbursing gbs reflects the growing empha-
sis in development cooperation on managing for results. 
however, the incentive effect is unlikely to be achieved 
because of serious shortcomings in the incentive mecha-
nisms, particularly in relation to variable tranches, and 
the difficulties in assessing whether conditions have been 
met or not.
dialogue is rightfully considered by the Commission to be  (d) 
a key component of its gbs programmes but is not used to 
its full potential. gbs programmes have had a catalytic ef-
fect with regard to strengthening dialogue on the national 
budget and pfm, but the absence of a dialogue strategy for 
each programme and insufficient expertise in delegations 
are key limiting factors with regard to greater and more 
effective involvement in dialogue.special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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The Commission should determine the amounts to be allo-
cated to individual gbs programmes in a better supported 
and more transparent manner. The Commission should:
make a structured assessment weighing up risks and  (a) 
benefits;
be able to demonstrate that the amount of funds allo- (b) 
cated to the gbs programme is appropriate in view of 
the objectives and the framework for dealing with risks 
and benefits.
in accordance with its recent new strategy for technical 
cooperation, the Commission should focus its capacity-
building support on priority needs. in doing so, the Com-
mission should:
carry out, with the partner country and in coordina- (a) 
tion with other donors, an assessment of its priority 
capacity-building needs;
focus on the areas where its support can provide most  (b) 
value added;
give sufficient attention to the needs for support to  (c) 
accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms of the 
partner country, as well as to areas other than pfm.
rEcommEndatIon 3
fInancIal rEsourcEs
rEcommEndatIon 4
caPacIty-BuIldInG suPPort52
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The Commission should strengthen its management of per-
formance-related conditions. in doing so, the Commission 
should:
make a formalised appraisal of the appropriate propor- (a) 
tion of fixed and variable tranches in view of the coun-
try’s specific circumstances as well as the objectives and 
design of the gbs programme;
as regards general eligibility conditions, set out in each  (b) 
financing agreement a clear assessment framework that 
defines the conditions, timetable, source of evidence, 
as well as criteria against which satisfactory progress 
has to be assessed;
as regards specific conditions for the disbursement of  (c) 
variable tranches:
set out clear indicators, targets, calculation meth-   ο
ods and verification sources;
set  out  challenging  but  realistic  targets  using    ο
baselines, past trends and adequate assessment of 
the expected impacts of the actions and budgets 
planned to achieve these targets;
support disbursement decisions with a more structured  (d) 
and formalised demonstration of satisfactory progress 
during the period concerned by clearly setting the cri-
teria against which progress was to be assessed, the 
progress made and the reasons why progress may not 
have been according to plan.
rEcommEndatIon 5
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The Commission should strengthen its approach to dia-
logue. in doing so, the Commission should:
define for each gbs programme a dialogue strategy that  (a) 
sets out the objectives, content and modalities of the 
Commission’s involvement in dialogue;
ensure that the necessary expertise is available to allow  (b) 
the delegation to be effectively involved in the dialogue 
for the priority areas on which the gbs programme ob-
jectives focus;
report to external stakeholders on the dialogue under- (c) 
taken and its achievements.
rEcommEndatIon 6
dIaloGuE
99.  The Commission’s reporting to external stakeholders tends 
to focus on the potential benefits of gbs rather than on the 
implementation and achievements of its programmes. one 
reason for this is that the Commission has not set up internal 
reporting procedures for systematically assessing progress 
against all the stated objectives of its gbs programmes which 
could then be used as a source of information for reporting 
to external stakeholders. furthermore, in the absence of a 
suitable evaluation methodology, the Commission, like other 
donors, cannot yet demonstrate the effectiveness of gbs pro-
grammes.54
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This report was adopted by Chamber iii, headed by mr jan kinŠT, 
member of the Court of auditors, in luxembourg at its meeting of 
16 november 2010.
For the Court of Auditors
vítor manuel da silva Caldeira
President
The Commission should improve its reporting on the ef-
fectiveness of its gbs programmes. in doing so, the Com-
mission should:
systematically monitor progress against all stated inter- (a) 
mediate and ultimate objectives of the gbs programme 
and develop the internal reporting system according-
ly;
pursue its efforts, together with its partners, to develop  (b) 
a suitable and generally accepted evaluation method-
ology that allows the impact of gbs programmes to be 
assessed;
clearly distinguish in its reporting to external stakehold- (c) 
ers between ‘aid effectiveness’ in terms of the delivery 
processes of aid and ‘aid effectiveness’ in terms of the 
ultimate impact of the assistance in improving pfm sys-
tems and reducing poverty;
provide to external stakeholders a complete, clear  (d) 
and accurate picture of its gbs programmes, notably 
in respect of the risks involved, including corruption, 
progress made in the implementation of the programmes 
and the achievement of objectives.
rEcommEndatIon 7
rEPortInG on WhEthEr GBs Is mEEtInG  
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BudGEt suPPort commItmEnts and ProGrammInG In acP 
countrIEs untIl 31.12.2009
annEX I
Code Country
9th EDF commitments  10th EDF programming  10th EDF commitments 
GBS SBS GBS SBS GBS SBS
BB Barbados 10 500 000 8 300 000
BF Burkina Faso 197 000 000 2 000 000 320 000 000 75 000 000 325 620 000 50 000 000
BI Burundi 84 120 000 90 000 000 68 700 000
BJ Benin 92 580 000 97 000 000 100 000 000 75 600 000 76 900 000 25 000 000
BS Bahamas 4 200 000
BW Botswana 51 416 000 62 000 000 60 000 000
BZ Belize 10 000 000
CD Congo (RDC) 106 000 000 22 620 000
CF
Central African 
Republic
18 530 000 34 000 000 29 210 000
CG Congo (Brazzaville) 30 450 000
CV Cape Verde 21 225 000 33 000 000 16 300 000 11 500 000
DM Dominica 10 780 000 4 600 000
DO Dominican Republic 38 000 000 48 200 000 91 300 000 53 700 000
ET Ethiopia 58 273 703 162 464 024 195 000 000 200 000 000 200 000 000
FK Falkland Islands 4 547 116
GA Gabon 10 000 000
GD Grenada 10 000 000 5 000 000 5 290 000
GH Ghana 111 000 000 5 000 000 175 000 000 83 000 000 216 020 000 8 000 000
GM Gambia 22 000 000
GW Guinea-Bissau 18 100 000 32 000 000 32 950 000
GY Guyana 41 196 379 30 200 000 14 800 000
HT Haiti 36 200 000 48 000 000 10 000 000 64 580 000
JM Jamaica 32 550 000 12 250 000 60 500 000 33 000 000 41 900 000 33 000 000
KE Kenya 125 000 000 126 800 000 66 400 000
KM Comoros 16 465 000 7 270 000
LC Saint Lucia 6 900 000
LR Liberia 3 500 000 20 200 000 27 000 000
LS Lesotho 53 800 000 26 000 00056
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Code Country
9th EDF commitments  10th EDF programming  10th EDF commitments 
GBS SBS GBS SBS GBS SBS
MG Madagascar 129 500 000 170 000 000 160 000 000 90 000 000
ML Mali 156 530 000 87 000 000 150 000 000 106 500 000 155 700 000
MR Mauritania 38 000 000 29 000 000
MS Montserrat 17 200 000
MU Mauritius 28 552 531 44 357 000 43 500 000 44 990 000 16 600 000
MW Malawi 85 500 000 175 000 000 60 000 000 123 890 000
MZ Mozambique 149 922 000 92 700 000 311 000 000 181 200 000 315 110 000 30 000 000
NA Namibia 85 000 000 60 200 000
NC New Caledonia 21 500 000
NE Niger 181 000 000 150 000 000 135 000 000 93 000 000 15 000 000
PM
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon 12 810 000
RW Rwanda 101 764 000 175 000 000 35 000 000 184 440 000 78 800 000
SC Seychelles 7 500 000 15 500 000
SH Saint Helena 15 590 000
SL Sierra Leone 62 000 000 90 000 000 10 000 000 64 820 000
SN Senegal 53 000 000 133 000 000 25 000 000 75 000 000
ST
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
13 300 000
TC Turks and Caicos 
Islands
14 635 000
TD Chad 23 800 000
TG Togo 5 000 000 32 000 000 32 500 000
TT Trinidad and Tobago 27 300 000 24 300 000
TZ Tanzania 201 000 000 43 500 000 305 000 000 139 000 000 314 840 000 70 000 000
UG Uganda 92 000 000 17 500 000 175 000 000 55 000 000 175 000 000
VC Saint Vincent and  
the Grenadines 6 200 000
VU Vanuatu 4 750 000 8 600 000
WS Samoa 25 500 000 15 300 000
ZM Zambia 179 000 000 93 000 000 232 000 000 136 000 000 255 000 000 35 000 000
TOTAL 2 481 678 612 988 079 139 3 636 200 000 1 914 900 000 2 900 150 000 648 200 000
annEX Ispecial report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
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BudGEt suPPort commItmEnts In asIan and latIn amErIcan 
countrIEs untIl 31.12.2009 
Code Country GBS SBS TOTAL
BD Bangladesh 0 105 000 000 105 000 000
BO Bolivia 0 96 500 000 96 500 000
EC Ecuador 0 54 600 000 54 600 000
GT Guatemala 0 33 800 000 33 800 000
HN Honduras 60 500 000 34 000 000 94 500 000
ID Indonesia 0 145 000 000 145 000 000
IN India 0 340 000 000 340 000 000
KG Kyrgyzstan 0 65 000 000 65 000 000
KH Cambodia 23 100 000 30 000 000 53 100 000
LA Laos 16 200 000 0 16 200 000
NI Nicaragua 75 500 000 92 900 000 168 400 000
NP Nepal 0 38 000 000 38 000 000
PE Peru 0 60 800 000 60 800 000
PH Philippines 0 59 000 000 59 000 000
PK Pakistan 0 109 000 000 109 000 000
PY Paraguay 24 000 000 54 000 000 78 000 000
SV El Salvador 37 000 000 37 100 000 74 100 000
TJ Tajikistan 0 43 000 000 43 000 000
UY Uruguay 0 8 000 000 8 000 000
VN Vietnam 102 000 000 16 000 000 118 000 000
TOTAL 338 300 000 1 421 700 000 1 760 000 000
annEX II58
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EXEcutIvE summary
I.
The Commission welcomes the Court’s per-
formance audit on budget support as a 
useful input into the further refinement of 
its approach to providing aid through this 
instrument. The european Consensus on 
development policy (adopted by the euro-
pean parliament, the Council, the member 
states and the Commission in 2005) estab-
lished budget support as the european 
union’s preferred aid modality. This policy 
was adopted following substantial experi-
ence in implementing budget support pro-
grammes highlighting the potential ben-
efits of budget support in contributing to 
national policies for poverty reduction and 
economic reform. The prospect of increas-
ing the relative share of aid provided 
through budget support is an answer to 
the limitations met by the project modal-
ity in supporting the structural reforms. 
as the Court rightly notes, by working 
through national systems, budget support 
tends to strengthen ownership, support 
the role of national institutions, foster 
domestic accountability and facilitate the 
achievement of development objectives.
The Commission’s gbs programmes 
exist in their current form since the 
2000  communication ‘Community  
support  for  economic  reform  pro-
grammes and structural adjustment: 
review and prospects’ (Com(2000) 58).   
The Commission intends to update its 
budget support policy in 2011 following 
a public consultation based on a green 
paper that aims to collect views and evi-
dence that could contribute to improving 
its approach in the future and its current 
work with member states towards a more 
coordinated approach to eu budget sup-
port.
III.
The Commission takes care to ensure that 
it follows oeCd good practice guidance on 
budget support in order to maximise the 
potential benefits of budget support. This 
entails joint monitoring arrangements, har-
monised reporting, the streamlining of dis-
bursement conditions and the alignment 
of disbursements and reviews to fit in with 
national budgetary timetables. The prin-
ciples underlying this approach are firmly 
enshrined in the paris and accra declara-
tions on aid effectiveness to which the 
Commission fully subscribes. a key issue in 
this respect is the importance of delivering 
budget support in a timely and predictable 
manner so that countries can readily plan 
the scaling-up of poverty-focused public 
expenditure programmes. 
The Commission is continually striving to 
improve the effectiveness of design and 
management of its general budget sup-
port programmes. particular emphasis has 
been placed on the need to demonstrate 
and monitor eligibility for budget support 
through a focus on macroeconomic poli-
cies, improving public financial manage-
ment and credible poverty reduction strat-
egies. following the Court’s observations 
in its annual reports, the Commission has 
recently deepened its assessments of eli-
gibility through a more structured and for-
malised process.
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Iv.
The general and specific objectives of 
the Commission’s gbs programmes derive 
directly from the objectives of the national 
development and poverty reduction strate-
gies which they are designed to support. in 
countries where social sectors were a sig-
nificant component of the poverty reduc-
tion strategies, this has been reflected in 
gbs programmes. The Commission’s inten-
tion is to set out a more precise interven-
tion logic for gbs programmes which will 
provide a clearer articulation between 
general and specific objectives and will 
ensure a more precise definition of specific 
objectives.
v.
The Commission is strengthening its risk 
management framework in particular in 
the context of its revision of the budget 
support guidelines. The Commission 
already employs a number of important 
risk mitigation measures in the design and 
implementation of its budget support pro-
grammes. where the Commission notes 
that progress is insufficient, disbursements 
are withheld until credible reassurances or 
measures have been established.
vI.
The gbs envelope is established primarily 
by the assessment of the expected benefits 
and adapted in the light of the assessment 
of risk. The Commission is reviewing the 
criteria that inform decisions on amounts 
programmed for budget support through 
the consultation based on the green paper 
with a view to introducing a more struc-
tured approach.
vII.
The Commission aims to provide capacity-
building support to accompany budget 
support programmes with a view to ensur-
ing relevance and effectiveness. a number 
of important successes have been noted 
in key policy areas related to supporting 
domestic accountability, poverty monitor-
ing systems and public financial manage-
ment. Closer attention to design and an 
understanding of the institutional setting 
is essential to achieving sustainable and 
consistent results in delivering technical 
cooperation. for this reason, the Commis-
sion has recently established its backbone 
strategy on Technical Cooperation which is 
increasingly applied and sets out a frame-
work for assessment and identification of 
the needs. in addition, capacity-building 
support including to supreme audit insti-
tutions and parliaments or in poverty 
monitoring is frequently provided through 
separate but complementary programmes.
vIII.
The Commission has introduced result-
based conditions in budget support and 
has integrated important lessons learned 
over the years. This approach has been 
crucial in ensuring a stronger focus on 
outcomes in gbs performance monitoring 
in countries and has often been accompa-
nied by support to strengthen weaknesses 
in statistical systems. it is currently review-
ing its experience, including the extent to 
which countries find result-based condi-
tions an effective incentive to perform bet-
ter, through the consultation green paper 
on the future of eu budget support. in this 
context the green paper aims to estab-
lish how conditions can best contribute to 
policy dialogue and promote and capture 
progress in partner countries’ development 
results.
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IX.
policy dialogue is central to any general 
budget support programme. This is typi-
cally based on a multi-donor framework in 
which the Commission is actively engaged. 
a more strategic approach to the manage-
ment and documentation of policy dia-
logue, along with continued attention to 
training, will further enhance the effec-
tiveness of dialogue. in the context of both 
the green paper and in ongoing discus-
sions with eu member states, the Commis-
sion is in the process of reflecting on how 
to optimise the potential impact of policy 
dialogue in the context of general budget 
support programmes.
X.
The Commission publishes a wide range of 
reporting covering budget support issues 
such as the annual report on external 
assistance, country fiches on budget sup-
port sent to member states and the euro-
pean parliament, country evaluations and, 
in aCp countries, the joint annual reports 
on the implementation of the Csp. 
The Commission is not alone in facing the 
important challenge of reporting compre-
hensively on the impact of general budget 
support. nevertheless the strong demand 
from external stakeholders for such report-
ing is recognised. The Commission takes 
these challenges seriously and is working 
to develop more informative reporting on 
the results of its gbs programmes.
The Commission has taken the leadership 
in developing an evaluation methodology 
with the oeCd/daC which clearly sets out 
the main channels through which budget 
support contributes to poverty reduction.
it is expected that as evaluations progress 
they will increasingly feed into the Com-
mission’s annual reports on the manage-
ment of external assistance. in the mean-
time, the Commission has already taken 
steps to bolster the coverage of budget 
support in its 2010 annual report and 
through additional country information on 
budget support provided to member states 
and the european parliament. The Commis-
sion is ready to further develop its report-
ing on budget support in the light of feed-
back from stakeholders.
XI.
The Commission appreciates the Court’s 
recommendations in the context of gbs 
programmes, both from recent annual 
reports and this special report, and will 
use them as an input to refine and deepen 
the scope of its methodological guidelines 
for general budget support. 
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IntroductIon
6.
structural adjustment support was pro-
vided in different ways under previous 
edfs. The current Commission gbs is based 
on the communication ‘Community sup-
port for economic reform programmes and 
structural adjustment: review and pros-
pects’ (Com(2000) 58 of 4.2.2000) and sub-
sequent guidelines.
8.
The european consensus enshrined the 
objective to increase the use of budget 
support, where circumstances permit, as a 
means to strengthen ownership, to support 
partners’ national accountability and pro-
cedures, to finance national poverty reduc-
tion strategies (including operating costs 
of health and education budgets) and to 
promote sound and transparent manage-
ment of public finances.
9.
general budget support encourages the 
identification of the policy and institu-
tional constraints to the effective delivery 
of the partner governments’ functions. it 
also aims at contributing to the progressive 
removal of these constraints and focuses 
on overall country outcomes, rather than 
on specific and limited outputs.
oBsErvatIons
17.
The general and specific objectives of the 
Commission’s gbs programmes are derived 
directly from the objectives of the national 
development strategies which they are 
designed to support. where these are pov-
erty reduction strategies that give promi-
nence to the social sectors, these have 
been reflected in gbs programmes. 
The Commission’s intention is to better 
tailor objectives to the particular circum-
stances of the country.
18.
The Commission is encouraged by the 
Court’s recognition that the systematic 
inclusion of macroeconomic and pfm 
objectives is a positive feature. gbs pro-
gramme objectives should be derived from 
national priorities. This is the case in laos 
where internal audit was not government 
pfm top priority and the focus is on other 
critical areas of pfm reform where the 
Commission and other donors are provid-
ing support. as regards nicaragua, the gbs 
financing agreement describes pfm weak-
nesses and the main corrective measures 
taken by the government. progress on pfm 
reform specific objectives defined by the 
government and gbs donors in the frame-
work of a joint financing agreement (jfa) 
for the provision of general budget sup-
port was monitored through a perform-
ance assessment framework (paf). The con-
ditions set in the financing agreement for 
the release of the gbs programme tranches 
explicitly refer to both the jfa and the 
paf. 
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as regards paraguay, the disbursement 
conditions also include a large number of 
pfm-related criteria. The Commission, how-
ever, agrees that pfm objectives, which 
can be related to disbursement conditions 
and indicators, can be more specific and is 
addressing this in the revision of its guide-
lines.
19.
The Commission is aware of the stronger 
focus on growth and infrastructure issues 
in most recent national development strat-
egies compared to the ones of the last dec-
ade. in this context, sustainable growth is 
indicated as a key global objective in the 
intervention logic in the Commission’s gbs 
guidelines and is also explicitly empha-
sised in a number of more recent gbs 
programmes. even where growth-related 
issues have not been explicitly identified 
as specific objectives in gbs programmes, 
they are typically addressed in the context 
of the overall assessment of the national 
strategy which is made at the time of for-
mulation and before each disbursement 
through an assessment of progress against 
paf indicators. in the case of uganda, 
therefore, while growth-related issues have 
not been explicitly identified as a specific 
objective of the programme, these are nev-
ertheless captured in the paf and assessed 
by the Commission before each disburse-
ment. The revision to the intervention 
logic in the gbs guidelines will seek to 
clarify the definition of specific objectives. 
it is anticipated that this will be informed 
by the recently established budget support 
evaluation methodology.
20.
general budget support (gbs) by defini-
tion does not aim to support a specific 
sector, but rather aims at providing addi-
tional discretionary resources to support 
macroeconomic stability, public financial 
management and to enhance the pros-
pects of delivering its public expenditure 
programmes across the full range of its 
development policies. in a limited number 
of cases (Tanzania and dominican repub-
lic under the ninth edf and Zambia and 
dominican republic under the 10th edf) 
the specification of the poverty reduction 
gbs objectives includes one social sector 
that is also a focal sector. while it has been 
the Commission’s approach to emphasise 
social sectors in the definition of the objec-
tives in the design of its gbs programmes, 
implementation has nevertheless taken full 
account of progress across the entire range 
of poverty indicators in the country’s per-
formance assessment framework. 
21.
The Commission considers that its coordi-
nation with other gbs providers in most 
cases is advanced and structured. The 
Commission actively contributes to the 
process involving partner countries and 
gbs donors that leads to the definition of 
country-specific performance assessment 
frameworks. The Commission is committed 
to the 2007 eu Code of Conduct on Com-
plementarity and division of labour in 
development policy and intends to ensure 
that gbs objectives are consistent with 
this commitment. The Commission con-
siders that the question of the extent to 
which gbs programmes should have secto-
ral objectives should be further explored.
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22.
The articulation of specific objectives in 
financing agreements will be made clearer 
and more detailed. in addition, the Com-
mission will establish a framework for 
assessing progress to be achieved over the 
lifetime of a general budget programme.
23.
The Commission welcomes the acknowl-
edgement of the improved clarity and 
structure of 10th edf financing agreements 
which also reflects the Court’s observa-
tions in the 2008 and 2009 das reports and 
will further develop this approach thereby 
allowing it to be generalised.
23. (a)
The Commission is refining its guidance 
to provide a clearer framework for assess-
ing the relevance and credibility of devel-
opment strategies and pfm reform pro-
grammes.
23. (b)
The Commission has recently (june 2010) 
established a structured approach to iden-
tifying key objectives and monitoring 
progress in pfm reforms. it is exploring 
how to extend this approach to poverty 
reduction strategies.
Box 1 – selecting and formulating 
objectives
weak Commission practice: nicaragua
The gbs programme in nicaragua was con-
ceived to support the objectives of the 
national development plan of the govern-
ment, with an emphasis on its rural com-
ponents. The rural focus of the programme 
is reflected in the indicators selected, 
which relate to key aspects in relation to 
the objectives/priorities of the plan. These 
include child malnutrition, access to drink-
able water, access to the public healthcare 
system and access to land, investments in 
rural areas and the decentralisation of the 
public expenditure. 
The objectives relating to pfm improve-
ment were defined by the government and 
gbs donors in the framework of a joint 
financing agreement for the provision of 
gbs, including a performance assessment 
framework. The conditions selected for 
the release of the programme’s tranches, 
which explicitly refer to both the jfa and 
the paf. The Commission agrees that the 
link between objectives, expected results, 
indicators and disbursement conditions 
could be better articulated and is address-
ing this in the revision of its guidelines.
26.
The dynamic approach taken by the Com-
mission is used by the majority of general 
budget support providers including the 
imf, world bank and eu member states 
providing general budget support.
27.
The risk of non-utilisation of budget sup-
port resources is a synthesis of the risk of 
non-compliance with the three eligibility 
criteria for the use of the instrument. The 
Commission will develop its risk assess-
ment and extend it beyond its current use 
in the edf programming phase.
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28.
The Commission manages the risks asso-
ciated with general budget support pro-
grammes through the rigorous assessment 
of the eligibility criteria and, in particular, 
by monitoring the achievement of agreed 
performance targets. where the Commis-
sion notes that progress is insufficient, 
disbursements are withheld until credible 
reassurances or measures have been estab-
lished. There is thus no financial risk as 
such. The Commission intends to develop 
and extend its risk assessment framework 
in the context of the revision of its guide-
lines.
29.
weaknesses in pfm systems may imply 
potential management and development 
risk for government funds in the countries 
concerned. it is for this reason that the 
Commission and other donors undertake 
detailed pfm diagnostics, using the inter-
nationally recognised pefa methodology, 
in advance of each general budget sup-
port operation. in addition, the Commis-
sion requires that potential general budget 
support beneficiaries have in place a rele-
vant and credible pfm reform strategy. The 
implementation of this strategy is closely 
monitored and reported upon by the Com-
mission in collaboration with other donors, 
including through the periodic update of 
the initial pefa assessment.
30.
The existence of corruption hinders aid 
effectiveness in general and its potential 
impact is by no means confined to general 
budget support programmes. what is clear 
is that the steady improvement in financial 
control and public procurement systems 
pursued in the context of general budget 
support programmes effectively reduces 
the scope for corruption.
in the green paper the Commission 
addresses the issue of measures the eu 
should apply if the risk level is considered 
high with regard to fraud and corruption.
32.
The methodologies of the uk and france 
are based on the same pefa assessments 
that the Commission uses. There is there-
fore no significant difference in the infor-
mation content of the eC, uk or french 
pfm assessments. The only major differ-
ence lies in the use of the pefa in the uk 
and french approach to develop an explicit 
judgement of fiduciary risk.
The Commission is also further developing 
its risk assessment framework. it is also 
making more systematic use of domestic 
supreme audit institution reports in assess-
ing pfm systems, as explicitly addressed 
in the revised guidance on pfm reporting 
issued in june 2010.
33.
The Commission agrees to promote greater 
use of the tools available to complement 
and deepen the assessments made using 
the internationally recognised pefa frame-
work. 
The Commission’s revised guidance on pfm 
reporting which was issued in june 2010 
explicitly requires reporting on corruption 
and the Commission will continue to regu-
larly review the scope for additional stud-
ies of corruption.
34.
under the authority of the supreme audit 
institution of a beneficiary country, addi-
tional audits and other specific measures 
are useful for increasing transparency and 
deepening the existing diagnostics of the 
pfm system. in this context, the Commis-
sion’s guidelines on gbs underline the 
value of selected audits of internal control 
systems to give further insights into how 
to focus capacity-building in pfm and miti-
gate risks. The further development of the 
Commission’s risk assessment framework 
will provide a more precise approach to 
identifying key risks and defining appro-
priate measures for their reduction.
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35.
The measures mentioned by the Court 
(audits, public expenditure tracking sur-
veys and public expenditure reviews) are 
lengthy processes to design and manage 
to eventual completion. The development 
of the Commission’s risk assessment frame-
work will provide a more precise approach 
to identifying key risks and defining 
appropriate sequencing and prioritisation 
of measures to manage these risks. in this 
context, the Commission intends to pro-
mote the use of shorter-term measures.
36.
The issue of corruption has already been 
addressed in the revised format for pfm 
reporting on ongoing programmes which 
was established in june 2010. more-
over, in the implementation of gbs pro-
grammes the emergence of corruption 
typically leads to a reinforced and inten-
sive dialogue with government on how 
to respond to the issues. for instance, in 
Tanzania (2008) and Zambia (2009) this led 
to the suspension of budget support dis-
bursements pending the elaboration and 
progress made in action plans in response 
to specific corruption cases.
Box 2 – reducing fiduciary risk
good Commission practice: ethiopia
ethiopia is an interesting example of a pro-
gramme using decentralised government 
systems and promoting their strengthen-
ing. while it is not implemented by the 
Commission under the budget support 
modality, some of the specific features 
could be applied to gbs programmes.
weak Commission practice: paraguay
The preparatory documents of the gbs 
programme in paraguay presented an over-
view of the main pfm weaknesses based on 
the available diagnostic and discussions 
with the government services. This analy-
sis was based on the pfm reform plan ini-
tiated by the paraguayan authorities. dur-
ing its implementation, the programme 
has been instrumental in addressing the 
main pfm weaknesses that have been fur-
ther highlighted by the pefa diagnostic. 
The paraguayan government prepared a 
thorough pfm reform plan that has, suc-
cessfully, passed from one executive to 
the next following the historical change 
of the 2007 elections. The programme also 
provides for technical assistance to sup-
port the government’s reform programme, 
together with the world bank and the inter 
american development bank. Thus there is 
not financial risk as such.
The Commission will further strengthen its 
risk management framework and address 
this in the context of its revision of the 
general budget support guidelines.
37.
in its appraisal of eligibility for a budget 
support programme the Commission 
undertakes an assessment of the relevance 
and credibility of the underlying strategy. 
This assessment will be made more struc-
tured and will be more clearly linked to 
gbs design. further guidance will be incor-
porated into the revised guidelines.
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38.
poverty reduction strategy papers (prsps) 
and their equivalent national strategies 
are the basis of all Commission aid and not 
just gbs. more generally, all daC donors 
intend to align their aid with prsps or their 
equivalent national strategies. The prsps 
in countries receiving gbs have been sub-
ject to imf/world bank joint staff advisory 
reviews, based upon which both institu-
tions have deemed the strategies sufficient 
basis for concessional lending.
improving the budgeting process and its 
linkages with national development strat-
egies is at the centre of pfm reforms sup-
ported through gbs programmes. further 
efforts are needed to strengthen these 
linkages.
39.
The issues of development risk are nor-
mally included in the identification and 
action fiches under the risk heading. The 
Commission will make its risk assessment 
framework more explicit in line with the 
approach currently taken for fragile states. 
further guidance on the assessment of the 
development risk will be incorporated into 
the Commission’s revised guidelines.
in the case of uganda, the Commission is 
currently working with other donors to 
identify key areas where risk mitigation 
measures may be appropriate.
as regards paraguay, the risks identified 
by the Commission’s study for gbs of june 
2005 were used as background for formula-
tion. The government of paraguay adopted 
in 2006 its new poverty strategy approach 
that intended to address the weaknesses 
found. The gbs programme was conceived 
to support the implementation of this 
strategy (and notably institutional build-
ing, interinstitutional coordination and 
social investment prioritisation).
43.
The Commission will review how it decides 
amounts programmed for general budget 
support (see paragraph 44), including 
through the consultation based on the 
green paper on budget support, in view of 
introducing a more structured approach 
that will include a more explicit assess-
ment of expected benefits and risks. more 
precise objectives will contribute to this 
assessment. This remains a complex mat-
ter that will have to take into account the 
overall objectives of gbs operations and 
the global framework of the Commission’s 
cooperation with the partner country.
44.
within the overall amount allocated to a 
partner country’s indicative programme, 
the financial size of the potential gbs enve-
lope depends on the importance of the 
expected benefits such as the achievement 
of the overall objectives of the Csp and 
the more specific ones in the focal areas of 
cooperation. The potential gbs envelope 
may be adapted in the light of the assess-
ment of risk. The proposed amount is the 
result of dialogue and negotiation with the 
partner countries and member states and 
takes into account other important dimen-
sions, such as the government’s track 
record with effectively managing budget 
support, the presence of other budget sup-
port providers, the degree of coordination 
and opportunity for policy dialogue.
47.
The Commission welcomes the Court’s rec-
ognition of the generally good predict-
ability of its general budget support pay-
ments and of their alignment with country 
budget cycles and calendars.
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51–55.
The Commission’s capacity-building sup-
port is increasingly provided in line with 
the principles of the recent backbone 
strategy on Technical Cooperation. This 
strategy sets a framework for assessment 
and identification of the needs. in many 
cases capacity-building support includ-
ing to supreme audit institutions, parlia-
ments or in health or education sectors is 
provided through separate programmes to 
ensure the programmes are well planned, 
the funds are better allocated and spent on 
time. moreover analysis of capacity devel-
opment needs must always take account of 
other donors’ programmes and of the nec-
essary division of labour in each sector.
57.
often gbs programmes funds allocated to 
capacity-building support are only partially 
committed. Consequently, the Commission 
has increasingly delivered such capacity-
building programmes through separate 
programmes, subject to specific identifi-
cation and formulation phases. however, 
capacity development programmes have 
their own challenges and usually require 
several years before bringing sustainable 
results.
Box 3 – capacity-building support
weak Commission practice: benin
The link between the eu general budget 
support to the pfm system in benin and 
other donors’ support has only been pos-
sible since 2006. it is the result of the 
development of the strategic framework 
‘gestion budgétaire axée sur les résultats’ 
(Car-gbar) initiated by the Commission. 
it was a lengthy and demanding process 
which was financed by the Commission 
capacity-building support programme for 
the reform towards public management by 
objectives. 
in the framework of the 10th edf, the eC 
is providing capacity-building support to 
the government pfm action plan based on 
the pefa assessment followed by a needs 
assessment. This support is in a separate 
financing agreement but focuses on the 
main pfm areas discussed between the 
government and the general budget sup-
port donor group. The eC will implement 
the project with the financial support of 
three member states.
Box 4 – selection of conditions
weak Commission practice: benin
indicators and targets for the educa-   Ū
tion sector in benin were set up by the 
government in its national development 
strategy and agreed within the educa-
tion working group where the Com-
mission  is  a  member.  indicators  and 
targets refer to quantifiable issues and 
do not include systematically qualita-
tive aspects. analyses developed by the 
government and the donors in the joint 
annual reviews are also used by the del-
egation to assess overall performance.
The exclusion (neutralisation) of two    Ū
health indicators in the calculation of 
the  variable  tranche  for  2006  was  a 
pragmatic response to this issue in or-
der to ensure continued policy coher-
ence. This arose out of an intense dis-
cussion with the government and other 
development partners in the framework 
of regular dialogue on general budget 
support.
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not  all  pfm-related  weaknesses  can    Ū
be addressed in budget support vari-
able tranches but need to be addressed 
through the pfm general conditions, in 
capacity-building and through policy di-
alogue. Coordination with other donors 
in these matters is also of importance 
(e.g. in benin tax collection is closely 
followed by the imf). up until 2009 tax 
collection in benin was less of a prob-
lem due to the then positive macroeco-
nomic environment, which explains why 
this indicator was not selected in 2008. 
it should be noted that external control 
is followed in the framework of the pfm 
reform programme.
62.
policy dialogue rooted in a partner coun-
try’s own budgetary and policy processes 
is essential to ensure that the policy meas-
ures needed to achieve agreed targets are 
identified, discussed and fully resourced. 
such dialogue helps to ensure a clearer 
link between the use of resources (includ-
ing budget support) and achieving results, 
and much needs to be done to make it 
more effective. ensuring the coherence 
between targets and resources is a gov-
ernment responsibility that the Commis-
sion and other development partners can 
only influence indirectly. nevertheless, the 
Commission pursues this issue actively in 
the context of its regular dialogue with 
partner governments.
63.
The Commission and other development 
partners aim to ensure that baselines and 
targets are clear, realistic and ambitious. at 
the same time, the importance of respect-
ing country ownership requires that the 
targets set are the ultimate responsibility 
of the national authorities.
in certain cases, such as in paraguay, tar-
gets that are no different from the base-
line are appropriate when the aim is to 
preserve an already good performance in 
the face of a rising population. 
65.
The Commission has, each time that it 
appeared necessary, opted to provide an 
additional tranche to address relevant 
development and reform issues, and to 
give further impetus to the reform process 
and the policy dialogue through additional 
conditions.
66.
The Commission welcomes the Court’s rec-
ognition of the improvement in its analysis 
under the 10th edf. Concerning pfm, the 
Commission will improve its guidance in 
order to set out precise reform objectives 
in the field of pfm and to improve pfm   
monitoring.
67.
where data is known to be unreliable the 
Commission does not use this in variable 
tranche targets.
in case serious deficiencies are identified 
in the national statistical systems, support 
to relevant capacity-building measures is 
systematically considered by the Commis-
sion.
although performance against targets is 
measured annually, it is more appropri-
ate to assess the incentive effect of vari-
able tranche targets over the medium 
term when trends can be observed and 
progress confirmed. at the same time, a 
more medium-term perspective for meas-
uring such targets, such as under the mdg 
contracts, allows a better appreciation of 
progress.
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70.
Commission dialogue on gbs is framed 
by the architecture of its programmes, in 
particular general and specific conditions, 
and by the joint donor framework within 
which gbs is delivered. in 2009, 74 % of 
gbs funds disbursed to aCp countries 
were in the framework of a memorandum 
of understanding that defines the timing 
and the modality of dialogue. in the same 
year, 77 % of disbursements’ progress was 
assessed following a common performance 
assessment framework agreed and moni-
tored with the partner governments and 
81 % of disbursements were informed by 
a joint government-donor structured dia-
logue mostly documented in aide-memoire, 
where the Commission actively partici-
pates.
71.
although the Commission’s guidelines 
on gbs give some indications on how to 
conduct policy dialogue with the partner 
country and with other stakeholders, the 
Commission is considering a more strate-
gic approach to policy dialogue. effective 
policy dialogue depends on many com-
plex country-specific aspects that cannot 
always be anticipated. at the same time, 
the Commission will continue to provide 
a comprehensive series of training pro-
grammes on the priority areas related to 
general budget support programmes which 
are targeted at staff with direct responsi-
bility for managing such programmes.
72.
The Commission acknowledges that guid-
ance on dialogue can always be improved 
and work is currently being undertaken on 
this aspect of guidance to delegations.
73.
a critical factor in ensuring successful dia-
logue on the national budget and pfm is 
the staff expertise in delegations. where 
gbs programmes have defined objectives 
which are not sufficiently covered by such 
expertise, the Commission increasingly 
uses division of labour arrangements with 
member states and other partners whilst 
retaining full responsibility for the man-
agement of its programmes. in any case, 
over the medium term the Commission 
seeks to ensure that critical areas of exper-
tise are covered through recruitment and 
the rotation exercise.
74.
The capacities and expertise of the del-
egation are of utmost importance for the 
proper management of general budget 
support operations. The presence of quali-
fied staff on the ground is essential to 
pursuing the regular policy dialogue that 
is fundamental to the general budget sup-
port instrument. for this reason, the Com-
mission carefully reviews staffing situa-
tions with regard to the appropriate skills 
needed for dealing with general budget 
support. however, the allocation of staff is 
constrained by the provisions of the finan-
cial framework and the anticipated zero 
growth in Commission staff.
75.
The Commission requires sufficient exper-
tise to actively participate in dialogue 
related to gbs programmes. for such pro-
grammes, a broad-based staff profile is 
appropriate. in this way, the Commission 
is able to actively follow key issues of sec-
toral dialogue in the context of monitor-
ing overall progress in poverty reduction. 
in benin, the delegation participates in 
the education and health sectors’ reviews 
as well as in the discussions on these sec-
tors’ performance during the joint annual 
review.
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76.
it is the Commission’s standard practice 
to accompany each disbursement with an 
information letter to the national authori-
ties. such letters typically highlight key 
areas to be pursued in further dialogue.
77.
a more strategic approach to policy dia-
logue will enhance the prospects of suc-
cess. The documentation of dialogue is an 
important factor in ensuring sustainabil-
ity and impact. The revised guidelines will 
foresee the better documentation of the 
dialogue.
Box 5 – dialogue
weak Commission practice: paraguay
in paraguay, country circumstances have 
largely affected the dialogue between the 
donor community and the government. 
Consequently, the Commission’s efforts 
to reach coordination mechanisms have 
yielded mitigated results. This was due, in 
particular, to the context of the elections, 
resulting in a fundamental change of the 
government and its political orientations 
and, then, to the installation of the newly 
elected government which affected ini-
tiatives during 18 months of programme 
implementation. 
in this context, the technical dialogue 
within the programme was focused on 
performance indicators and the Commis-
sion participated actively in the dialogue 
on the development of the social policy of 
the government which included the social 
protection network (meetings, workshops, 
international experts, publication of the 
policy).
78.
The joint annual reports on development 
cooperation with aCp countries that are 
produced and published each year on the 
implementation of country strategy papers 
and national indicative programmes in aCp 
countries give an updated and accurate 
account of the status of implementation of 
all programmes, including general budget 
support. This includes the presentation of 
possible difficulties encountered during 
implementation.
81.
The Commission only proceeds with gen-
eral budget support when the necessary 
conditions are in place. for this reason, it 
considers that all of the potential benefits 
can indeed be realised, although reporting 
on the impact of general budget support 
presents significant challenges. 
The Commission is not alone in facing this 
issue while the strong demand from exter-
nal stakeholders for more in-depth report-
ing is recognised. The Commission takes 
these challenges seriously and is working 
to develop more informative reporting. it 
is expected that as budget support evalu-
ations progress they will increasingly feed 
into the Commission’s annual reports on 
the management of external assistance. 
The Commission carefully reviews staff-
ing situations with regard to the appropri-
ate skills needed for dealing with general 
budget support. however, the allocation of 
staff is constrained by the provisions of the 
financial framework and the anticipated 
zero growth in Commission staff.
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82.
The Commission considers that the ulti-
mate impact of gbs on poverty reduction 
depends on the specific circumstances in 
each country. it also depends on the effec-
tive management of gbs programmes. 
following the core principles of the paris 
declaration and oeCd good practice in the 
design and management of general budget 
support enhances impact.
84.
internal reporting on general budget sup-
port is being further developed. neverthe-
less the question of impact will remain a 
challenge due to the difficulty in attrib-
uting results to inputs under the general 
budget support modality. at the same 
time, the ‘results oriented monitoring sys-
tem’ has also been revised to cover sector 
policy support programmes, which also 
include sector budget support. Consider-
ation is being given as to how to extend 
this to gbs. in addition, the Commission is 
working on a database containing histori-
cal data of all budget support programmes 
including the indicators monitored.
85.
independent evaluations of country pro-
grammes carried out in 20 countries where 
budget support has been a significant fea-
ture have been published by the Commis-
sion. 
86.
The Commission is moving ahead to estab-
lish a body of evaluation evidence in order 
to better understand critical factors for 
success and the nature of the impact on 
development objectives. 
The oeCd/daC joint evaluation under-
taken in 2006 provided evidence of gbs 
contributing to improved service deliv-
ery but did not extend this analysis to an 
assessment of impact on final beneficiar-
ies. in response to this, the Commission 
has since taken a prominent leadership 
role in developing a new budget support 
evaluation methodology (for gbs and sbs) 
which clearly sets out the main channels 
through which budget support contributes 
to development objectives, including the 
impact on final beneficiaries. The method-
ology was approved by oeCd/daC mem-
bers in 2009 and is in the process of being 
tested in three countries. The results of 
the test will allow the further refinement 
of the methodology with a view to com-
mencing periodic joint evaluations (among 
oeCd/daC members) from 2011 onwards.
given the multiple and complex factors 
at work in delivering sustainable poverty 
reduction it is unrealistic to expect any 
evaluation methodology of development 
aid can fully resolve the issue of how to 
attribute results to development pro-
grammes. This fundamental issue is not 
unique to general budget support and the 
inherent challenges in the evaluation of 
such interventions have been recognised 
by the Court’s reports related to structural 
funds.
88.
The Commission’s revised guidelines issued 
in june 2010 explicitly address this point 
of pfm reporting. The revised pfm report 
sets out a framework whereby progress 
can be assessed on an annual basis against 
initial reform expectations.
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89.
The Commission focuses strongly on 
improvements in pfm systems as this is a 
key factor in reducing corruption.
in line with the further development of its 
risk assessment framework, the Commis-
sion will be better able to report on key 
risks as they evolve during the implemen-
tation of its general budget support pro-
grammes.
90.
it is clear that pefa is not a risk assess-
ment tool as such, even if it enables iden-
tification of main pfm weaknesses. pefa is 
a diagnostic instrument to set the baseline 
for the partner country’s pfm system and 
to serve as a basis for dialogue on pfm 
reform.
91.
The Commission has already taken steps 
to bolster the coverage of general budget 
support in its 2010 annual report and is 
ready to further develop this in the light 
of feedback from stakeholders.
conclusIons and  
rEcommEndatIons
93.
The Commission considers that its meth-
odology for providing general budget sup-
port is in line with key oeCd principles 
and best practice applied by other major 
general budget support providers, particu-
larly in europe. The Commission is continu-
ally striving to improve the methodology 
of its approach to general budget support 
following lessons learned at internal level 
by all donors providing general budget 
support. in this context the Commission is 
revising its guidelines in order to deepen 
the assessment of eligibility and ensure 
that evidence for general budget support 
decisions are presented in a more precise 
and formalised way. The revised guidelines 
will also strengthen the approach to the 
management issues that the Court iden-
tifies in this report. at a later stage they 
will also be amended to take into account 
the conclusions and recommendations of 
the debate launched by the Commission at 
eu level with the publication of the green 
paper on budget support.
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95.
The Commission appreciates the Court’s 
recommendations, both from recent annual 
reports and this audit, and is refining and 
deepening the scope of its methodological 
guidelines for budget support to address 
these observations. in this respect the 
Commission has already strengthened 
the basis for its country-based reporting 
on public financial management in order 
to provide a more precise and formalised 
basis for monitoring this critical aspect 
of general budget support eligibility. The 
revision of the guidelines is expected 
to be finalised in 2011 and is expected 
to address or deepen the following key 
areas:
refinement of the allocation criteria for    Ū
general budget support programming;
rationalisation of the general budget    Ū
support intervention logic to improve 
the definition of objectives;
defining the preliminary analysis need-   Ū
ed for the identification of performance 
indicators;
development of a risk framework;   Ū
establishing a framework for monitoring    Ū
progress to be achieved over the life-
time of a general budget programme in 
national and sectoral poverty reduction 
and reform strategies;
incorporation of the principles of the    Ū
backbone strategy on Technical Coop-
eration for capacity development;
outline the strategic approach to dia-   Ū
logue guidance;
identify key reporting requirements.   Ū
in addition, the revised evaluation meth-
odology will be finalised.
96.
The objectives of gbs programmes derive 
directly from the objectives of the national 
development and poverty reduction strat-
egies which they are designed to support. 
such strategies are comprehensive in their 
coverage of the various dimensions of pov-
erty afflicting a given country. in order to 
monitor progress in a country’s poverty 
reduction programmes, the Commission’s 
approach, in line with that of other donors, 
is to take account of progress against an 
agreed set of objectives derived from the 
national strategy. The Commission agrees 
that the specific objectives should be more 
precise and better tailored to the particu-
lar circumstances of the country. 
recommendation 1 – selection and for-
mulation of objectives and expected 
results of GBs programmes
(a)
The Commission will ensure better comple-
mentarity between gbs and other Commis-
sion programmes.
(b)
The Commission agrees that programmes 
should be better tailored to the particular 
circumstances of the country. 
(c)
The ongoing revision to the guidelines 
on general budget support is developing 
a more precise framework for monitoring 
progress in national/sectoral strategies 
and public financial management.
(d)
The revised guidelines will provide more 
detailed guidance on the intervention 
logic underlying the general budget sup-
port programmes in order to better artic-
ulate the link between objectives and 
results.
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97.
The dynamic approach taken by the Com-
mission is used by the majority of other 
general budget support providers includ-
ing the imf, world bank and eu member 
states.
as acknowledged by the Court in para-
graph 34, the Commission uses a number 
of risk mitigation measures. for instance, 
where the Commission notes that com-
pliance with eligibility is no longer met, 
disbursements are withheld until cred-
ible reassurances or measures have been 
established. however, the Commission 
accepts that the risk management frame-
work should be strengthened and better 
structured.
recommendation 2 – management of the 
main risks to the effectiveness of GBs 
programmes
The Commission will further strengthen its 
risk management framework and address 
this in the context of its revision of the 
general budget support guidelines.
(a)
The Commission will seek to assess all key 
risks at the outset of gbs programmes and 
update them regularly during programme 
implementation.
(b)
The Commission’s revised guidance on    Ū
pfm reporting which was issued in june 
2010 directly addresses this recommen-
dation.
The Commission agrees to promote    Ū
greater use of the tools available to 
complement and deepen the assess-
ments made using the internationally 
recognised pefa framework. 
The Commission’s revised guidance    Ū
on pfm reporting which was issued in 
june 2010 explicitly requires reporting 
on corruption and the Commission will 
continue to regularly review the scope 
for additional studies of corruption.
(c)
The Commission is developing revised 
guidance to deepen its assessment of the 
credibility and relevance of national and 
sector development strategies which will 
include links to the budget.
(d)
The Commission will consider how to 
identify and incorporate appropriate risk 
mitigation measures in the context of its 
revised risk framework. in this context, 
the Commission has taken note of the uk 
guidelines to which the Court refers in 
paragraph 32.
98.
The Commission ensures that it follows 
oeCd good practice guidance on general 
budget support in order to maximise the 
potential benefits of general budget sup-
port.
(a)
The Commission will review how it decides 
amounts programmed for budget support 
through the consultation based on the 
green paper on budget support, in view 
of introducing a more precise approach in 
the future.
(b)
as acknowledged by the Court, the Com-
mission’s backbone strategy on Technical 
Cooperation is intended to improve the 
effectiveness of its capacity-building sup-
port.
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(c)
The Commission has introduced result-
based conditions in budget support and 
has integrated important lessons learned 
over the years. it is currently reviewing its 
experience, including the extent to which 
countries find result-based conditions 
an effective incentive to perform better, 
through the consultation green paper on 
the future of eu budget support. in this 
context the green paper aims to estab-
lish how conditions can best contribute to 
policy dialogue and promote and capture 
progress in partner countries’ development 
results.
(d)
policy dialogue is central to any general 
budget support programme. This is typi-
cally based on a multi-donor framework in 
which the Commission is actively engaged. 
a more strategic approach to the manage-
ment and documentation of policy dia-
logue, along with continued attention to 
training will further enhance the effective-
ness of dialogue. in the context of both 
the green paper and in ongoing discus-
sions with eu member states, the Commis-
sion is in the process of reflecting on how 
to optimise the potential impact of policy 
dialogue in the context of general budget 
support programmes.
recommendation 3 – financial resources
The Commission intends to review the cri-
teria that inform decisions on amounts 
programmed for general budget support 
through the consultation based on the 
green paper in view of introducing a more 
structured approach in the future. 
(a)
The Commission intends to develop a 
revised approach to this issue following 
the consultations under the green paper.
(b)
The Commission intends to develop a 
revised approach to this issue following 
the consultations under the green paper.
recommendation 4 – capacity-building 
support
The Commission’s capacity-building sup-
port is provided on demand-led basis 
which has recently been formalised in the 
backbone strategy on Technical Coop-
eration. This strategy sets a framework 
for assessment and identification of the 
needs.
(a)
The Commission will ensure that its needs 
assessment framework is applied on a sys-
tematic basis.
(b)
based on the outcome of the needs assess-
ment exercises, the Commission will seek 
to provide capacity-building support to 
areas where its impact will be maximised.
(c)
The Commission has increased in recent 
years its capacity-building support to 
supreme audit institutions, parliaments 
and anti-corruption bodies as well as to 
other areas where appropriate. The Com-
mission will continue to provide comple-
mentary support to areas other than pfm 
where appropriate.
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recommendation 5 – conditions
(a)
in the context of its revision to the gen-
eral budget support guidelines the Com-
mission will develop a clear set of issues 
to take into consideration when assessing 
the appropriate balance between fixed and 
variable tranches in the design of general 
budget support programmes.
(b)
The Commission welcomes the acknowl-
edgement of the improved clarity and 
structure of 10th edf financing agree-
ments in paragraph 23 which also reflects 
the Court’s observations in the 2008 and 
2009 das reports. it is intended that the 
revised guidelines will further consolidate 
this approach.
(c)
it is the partner government’s responsi-
bility to set indicators and targets, and 
assess the expected impact of actions and 
the budget planned to achieve the targets, 
although the Commission assesses the 
quality, measurability and realism of tar-
gets and engages in a dialogue on these 
issues. The revised general budget support 
guidelines will provide more detailed guid-
ance on the design of variable tranches 
taking into account this recommendation.
(d)
The Commission seeks to ensure that all 
disbursement decisions are made on the 
basis of a more structured and formalised 
demonstration of satisfactory progress.
recommendation 6 – dialogue
The Commission agrees that a more strate-
gic approach to policy dialogue enhances 
the prospects of success of its general 
budget support programmes. at the same 
time, the management and documentation 
of such dialogue is an important factor in 
ensuring its sustainability and impact.
(a)
The Commission intends to define a dia-
logue strategy and is addressing this in 
the context of the revised general budget 
support guidelines.
(b)
The Commission is aware of the impor-
tance of the availability of relevant exper-
tise and addresses this issue in the context 
of the rotation of staff, recruitment of con-
tract agents and the development of addi-
tional training courses. The presence of 
qualified staff on the ground is essential to 
pursuing the regular policy dialogue that 
is fundamental to the general budget sup-
port instrument. however, the allocation 
of staff is constrained by the provisions 
of the financial framework and the antici-
pated zero growth in Commission staff.
(c)
The Commission will examine how best to 
summarise the multiple country dialogues 
in which it is involved in its annual report 
on the management of external   assistance.
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99.
The Commission publishes a wide range of 
reporting covering budget support issues 
such as the annual report on external 
assistance, country fiches on budget sup-
port sent to member states and the euro-
pean parliament, country evaluations and, 
in aCp countries, the joint annual reports 
on the implementation of the Csp. 
The Commission is not alone in facing the 
important challenge of reporting compre-
hensively on the impact of general budget 
support. nevertheless the strong demand 
from external stakeholders for such report-
ing is recognised. The Commission takes 
these challenges seriously and is working 
to develop more informative reporting on 
the results of its gbs programmes.
recommendation 7 – reporting on 
whether GBs is meeting its objectives
(a)
The Commission agrees that it should 
more systematically monitor and report 
on progress and the new guidelines will 
address this. 
(b)
The Commission has taken the lead in 
developing an evaluation methodology 
and is in the process of testing it in col-
laboration with donor partners and recipi-
ent governments.
(c)
The Commission intends to clearly dis-
tinguish between delivery processes and 
results in its reporting on aid effective-
ness. The Commission is working on this 
aspect in the context of the revision of its 
guidelines.
(d)
it is expected that as evaluations progress 
they will increasingly feed into the Com-
mission’s annual reports on the manage-
ment of external assistance. in the mean-
time, the Commission has already taken 
steps to bolster the coverage of budget 
support in its 2010 annual report and 
through additional country information 
on budget support provided to member 
states and the european parliament. The 
Commission is ready to further develop its 
reporting on budget support in the light 
of feedback from stakeholders.
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